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Abstract
Quantum mechanics may be formulated as Sensible Quantum Mechanics
(SQM) so that it contains nothing probabilistic, except, in a certain frequency
sense, conscious perceptions. Sets of these perceptions can be deterministi-
cally realized with measures given by expectation values of positive-operator-
valued awareness operators in a quantum state of the universe which never
jumps or collapses. Ratios of the measures for these sets of perceptions can
be interpreted as frequency-type probabilities for many actually existing sets
rather than as propensities for potentialities to be actualized, so there is noth-
ing indeterministic in SQM. These frequency-type probabilities generally can-
not be given by the ordinary quantum “probabilities” for a single set of alter-
natives. Probabilism, or ascribing probabilities to unconscious aspects of the
world, may be seen to be an aesthemamorphic myth.
No fundamental correlation or equivalence is postulated between different
perceptions (each being the entirety of a single conscious experience and thus
not in direct contact with any other), so SQM, a variant of Everett’s “many-
worlds” framework, is a “many-perceptions” framework but not a “many-
minds” framework. Different detailed SQM theories may be tested against ex-
perienced perceptions by the typicalities (defined herein) they predict for these
perceptions. One may adopt the Conditional Aesthemic Principle: among the
set of all conscious perceptions, our perceptions are likely to be typical.
An experimental test is proposed to compare SQM with a variant, SQMn.
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1 Basic Ideas of Sensible Quantum Mechanics
Probabilities can seem rather mysterious in any theory or description that is
supposed to be complete. If probabilities are interpreted as indicating fundamental
uncertainties, then any theory that describes things probabilistically appears to
be uncertain and incapable of being as complete as some alternative theory that
describes more precisely what happens.
In many cases the incompleteness of a theory is overbalanced in our evaluation
by the relative simplicity it has in comparison with a more complete theory. Thus
in classical physics, for example, we may consider a statistical theory better than a
more complete alternative which gives the precise trajectory in phase space, because
the statistical theory may be much simpler. However, in such cases we readily agree
that the statistical theory is incomplete and usually believe that a more complete
description exists in principle.
Someone may despair of ever knowing a complete description of a certain system
(e.g., the complete history of the universe), and it may indeed be true that he will
never succeed in finding it, but that personal despair should not be misinterpreted as
evidence that no such complete description exists in principle. Furthermore, one can
argue that a complete description certainly exists, namely, the system itself. (One
might prefer that a complete theory appear simpler than the system it describes,
but that is a separate question from that of the existence of a complete theory.) So
in this paper I shall assume that a complete theory of the universe does exist in
principle, and that it is a goal of physics to search for one or at least to try to get
closer to one.
In the absence of a better alternative, it seems worthwhile to consider whether
quantum mechanics is a suitable framework for a complete theory of the universe.
But then one runs into the problem that quantum mechanics is usually interpreted
probabilistically, which seems to indicate that it cannot be complete. For example,
if the quantum probabilities are interpreted as propensities for several possible se-
quences of events to be actualized, and if only one sequence actually occurs, then
the theory is incomplete in not describing which particular sequence does occur.
Here, expanding upon previous work [1], I argue that quantum mechanics is a
complete framework for describing the unconscious aspects of reality (here called
the quantum world), because those aspects should not be described probabilistically.
Instead, I claim it is consistent to assume that they are completely described by
the quantum amplitudes (e.g., by the amplitudes in a path integral in a sum-over-
histories approach, or by an algebra of operators and a quantum state giving the
expectation value of these operators).
(More modestly, I am really merely claiming that quantum mechanics may be a
complete framework if it is absolutely correct. In view of the progression of science,
that latter assumption may be thought to be highly dubious, but in the spirit of
what Feynman [2] called Wheeler’s “radical conservatism,” I want to push as far as
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possible our present principles, in this case the assumption that quantum mechanics
is correct, which I shall make throughout the remainder of this paper. I wish to
transcend Wald’s insightful remark on page 309 of [3], “If you believe in quantum
mechanics, then you can’t take it seriously.” In particular, I am arguing that the
objections that can be raised against a probabilistic theory need not be objections
against quantum mechanics in the version I am proposing.)
However, our universe also includes conscious perceptions or sensations or phe-
nomenal first-person experiences (in what is here called the conscious world to dis-
tinguish it from the unconscious quantum world, though both together can be taken
to be the physical world if one accepts that terminology; this physical world includes
both the “mental world” and the “physical world” of Fig. 8.1 of Penrose’s Shadows
of the Mind [3]). These perceptions seem to have certain classical aspects that are
not captured merely by the full set of amplitudes for the quantum world, so I propose
that quantum mechanics be augmented to give real measures for sets of conscious
perceptions. In the particular augmentation I am proposing, which I call Sensible
Quantum Mechanics, or SQM, these measures are given by the expectation values
of particular awareness operators in the state of the quantum world. (This strong
connection between the conscious world and the quantum world in a thus-unified
physical world means that Sensible Quantum Mechanics is not fundamentally dual-
istic in any negative sense, any more than the quantum world is dualistic for having
the distinct elements of paths and amplitudes, or of operators and a quantum state.
However, it is dualistic in the sense of Chalmer’s The Conscious Mind [4], with
which I agree virtually completely for the first half of the book, except for some
minor issues of terminology, and for the final chapter, on the interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics, even though I had not seen this excellent book when I wrote the
present paper.)
Ratios of the measures of appropriate sets of conscious perceptions can be in-
terpreted as the classical conditional probabilities for these sets. In this way Sen-
sible Quantum Mechanics gives something like the usual probabilistic interpreta-
tion applied to ordinary quantum mechanics, but I am proposing that in the most
fundamental sense, probabilities are entirely restricted to conscious perceptions or
sensations. One might summarize this proposal by the slogan, “No nonsensical
probabilities!”
Thus I am proposing a framework or viewpoint in which probabilism, or interpret-
ing the unconscious quantum world itself probabilistically, is an aesthemamorphism
(from the Greek αισθησισ: perception, sense, sensation). It is a myth of attributing
a fundamental property of conscious perceptions to the quantum world, rather anal-
ogous to the myth of animism that ascribes living properties to inanimate objects.
Of course, probabilism may be a convenient myth, just as animism is a convenient
myth when we say such things as, “A charged particle feels an electromagnetic field,”
or when Feynman [5] wrote, “It isn’t that a particle takes the path of least action but
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that it smells all the paths in the neighborhood . . . ,” but it would give us a better
understanding of the world if we recognized it as a myth. My claim that probabilism
is a myth is also analogous to the claim that classical physics is a myth, since it
is only an approximation to an underlying quantum reality. (Of course, it may be
that quantum mechanics itself is a myth, but, as discussed above, in this paper I
am making the radically conservative assumption that it is absolutely correct. My
claim is that I have good reasons for identifying probabilism as a myth, whereas I
do not see any good evidence yet that quantum mechanics itself is a myth.)
Thus, by eliminating probabilities from the quantum world, quantum mechanics
is permitted to be a complete framework for that world. On the other hand, someone
may object that Sensible Quantum Mechanics reintroduces probabilities for the
conscious world and so cannot possibly be a complete theory for the entire physical
world of both the quantum world and the conscious world.
This objection would indeed be valid if the probabilities for sets of perceptions
in the conscious world were merely propensities for the existence of these percep-
tions, so that the particular set of perceptions which are actualized is not uniquely
determined by the theory. However, Sensible Quantum Mechanics instead gives the
picture of all sets of perceptions with nonzero measure as actually occurring. In this
way the theory is really not fundamentally probabilistic in the propensity sense even
for the conscious world. Instead, it is a many-perceptions theory, with the proba-
bilities to be interpreted almost in the frequency sense as the ratios of numbers of
perceptions that actually exist in the various sets. (I say “almost,” because the
probabilities need not be rational ratios, as the “numbers” of perceptions in the sets
really refer to the measured continua of perceptions in the sets.)
Thus Sensible Quantum Mechanics is very closely related to the “many-worlds”
interpretation [6, 7], in which probabilities also have the “frequency” interpretation
of being the ratios of measures. In both the quantum state never collapses as a result
of a measurement or perception. The main difference is that in Sensible Quantum
Mechanics, the “many” applies to conscious perceptions rather than to anything in
the unconscious quantum world.
2 Why I Claim Probabilism Is a Myth
Because the many-worlds interpretation is not fundamentally probabilistic in the
propensity sense, it seems to give a complete theory for the quantum world itself that
is probabilistic in the frequency sense. So why should I claim that such probabilism
is a myth? My argument is that it seems to be both ugly and unnecessary to ascribe
probabilities (even in merely the “frequency” sense) to the unconscious quantum
world.
The ugliness of applying probabilities to the quantum world lies in the arbitrari-
ness of the choice of which set of possibilities is to be assigned probabilities. This is
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the uncertainty of which set of amplitudes should be squared to get probabilities.
For example, one viewpoint is that it is the amplitude for each macroscopically
distinct outcome of a “measurement” that should be squared to get a probability.
(More precisely, this view is that one takes the expectation values of a complete set
of orthogonal projection operators, each representing one of the macroscopically-
distinct outcomes of the measurement process.) This viewpoint has the difficulty or
ugliness of requiring the specification of precisely what a “measurement” is supposed
to be, and precisely which projection operators are supposed to be measured by it.
A more inclusive viewpoint is that the expectation value of any projection op-
erator is a probability for the corresponding “event.” An even broader viewpoint
is that one can square the amplitude given by projecting the wavefunction not just
by one, but by a whole sequence of (possibly noncommuting) projection operators
representing a “history” or sequence of “events.” (For the resulting probabilities
to obey the sum rules under a coarse-graining of the projection operators, the
sequences must obey certain consistency conditions [8, 9].) One can extend this
viewpoint, of assigning probabilities to “consistent histories,” yet further to the
viewpoint that one can project the wavefunction by sums of sequences of projection
operators that represent coarser-grained histories. (Then one needs “decoherence”
conditions for the resulting probabilities to obey the sum rules for “decohering histo-
ries” [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].) An even further extension is the viewpoint
that probabilities are the real parts of the expectation values of sums of sequences
of projection operators, whenever these obey a “linear positivity” condition of being
nonnegative, giving probabilities for “linearly positive histories” that automatically
obey the sum rules [19].
In each of these broader viewpoints there is a family of many different allowed
sets of possibilities (e.g., the family of different complete sets of orthogonal pro-
jection operators in the first viewpoint of the previous paragraph, or the family of
consistent sequences of projection operators in the second viewpoint, etc.). To get
a set of frequency-type probabilities that sum to unity, there must apparently be a
mysterious choice of a unique set of possibilities out of the family of all such sets of
possibilities. In the absence of any definite simple principle for selecting this set, its
choice, and the resulting many-worlds (or perhaps “many-histories”) theory for the
unconscious quantum world itself, seems ugly.
One conceivable proposal for allowing probabilism without requiring quite so
much ugliness is the idea that all possibilities in all sets of possibilities in one of these
families actually occur, with measures given by the quantum expectation values in
one of the ways discussed above. Since, for a normalized quantum state, these
expectation values are designed to add up to unity for a single set of possibilities,
the measures will sum to more than unity when one adds up all the sets in a family.
In fact, typically the number of allowed sets of possibilities is infinite. For example,
even for a two-state spin-half system, there is a complete set of two orthogonal rank-
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one projection operators for each direction in space, and hence an infinite number
of such sets in the family of all complete sets of rank-one projection operators. This
means that the sum of the measures for all sets of possibilities is unnormalizable,
which is problematic.
This problem may be circumventable for certain choices of the family of sets
of possibilities. For example, suppose that the family is given by the set of all
decompositions of the identity operator into an ordered set of m orthogonal projec-
tion operators Pi of respective ranks ri, i = 1, . . . , m, for a quantum system with a
Hilbert space of dimension n =
∑m
i=1 ri. This family forms the proper flag manifold
U(n)/
∏m
i=1 U(ri), a compact homogeneous manifold of real dimension n
2 −∑mi=1 r2i .
For each point on this flag manifold, the expectation values of the corresponding
projectors give a set of m probabilities that sum to unity. Of course, just as in the
n = 2 case discussed above, the sum of the expectation values over the continuous
infinity of points of the proper flag manifold diverges. However, the proper flag
manifold can be given a natural homogeneous volume element that integrates to
unit volume over the entire manifold. Then the expectation value of the ith pro-
jector Pi can be reinterpreted as a probability density for the positive outcome of
that projector. If one integrates this probability density over a finite volume of the
proper flag manifold, one can interpret the result as the joint probability that the set
of possibilities is within that region of the flag manifold and that the ith projector
has a positive outcome.
For a family of consistent or decohering histories, defined by sets of class opera-
tors Cα(x
i) that depend upon some parameters or coordinates xi that locally label
each such set of histories in the family, one could introduce the Riemannian metric
gijdx
idxj =
∑
α
ReTr{[C†α(xi + dxi)− C†α(xi)][Cα(xj + dxj)− Cα(xj)]} (1)
and then take the volume element of this metric (normalized by the total volume over
the entire family). Then one could integrate the expectation value of C†α(x
i)Cα(x
i)
(the probability assigned by the consistent or decohering histories approach to the
particular outcome α in the family labeled by the particular coordinates xi, now to be
reinterpreted as a probability density over families of histories) over this normalized
volume element for the families in some set of ranges of the xi’s to get the joint
probability that the set of histories is within that region and that the outcome α is
positive.
In this way one could get a “many-many-worlds” interpretation with frequency-
type probabilities for the unconscious quantum world in which not only are all pos-
sibilities (with nonzero expectation value) within one set of possibilities interpreted
as actually occurring, but also all sets of possibilities within an appropriate family
are interpreted as actually occurring. However, one might object that even this con-
struction leaves it ambiguous which family of sets of possibilities should be chosen.
For example, I might prefer to choose the family given by the set of all decomposi-
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tions of the identity operator into an ordered set of orthogonal rank-one projection
operators, whereas someone else might prefer the family of all decohering histories.
One might also object that the constructions outlined above for these two particular
classes of families (those decomposing the identity operator into orthogonal projec-
tion operators Pi and those decomposing it into other suitable operators Cα) are
rather cumbersome and hence do not completely avoid the problem of ugliness.
These attempts to ascribe probabilities to the unconscious quantum world ap-
pear not only to be ugly but also to be unnecessary. Probabilities from an accepted
theory can help us to predict what types of experiences we may expect, and the
probabilities assigned to our experiences by an uncertain theory may be used to
test that theory, but those predictions and tests strictly apply to experiences as
consciously perceived. We really have no way of assigning a meaning to probabil-
ities for things that are not consciously experienced, and neither can we test such
probabilities. Probabilities can be arbitrarily assigned to things in the unconscious
quantum world, as in the “many-many-worlds” interpretation outlined above, but
without relating them to conscious perceptions, their meaning is ambiguous. Such
probabilities are fundamentally unnecessary for selecting and using a theory for our
experiences.
This diatribe against taking probabilism as a fundamental truth is not meant
to be a denial of the current historical circumstance that for heuristic purposes it
may often be convenient to use the myth of probabilism to assign “probabilities”
to things in the unconscious quantum world as a substitute or approximation for
what I am arguing are the more fundamental probabilities, in the “frequency” sense,
for sets of conscious perceptions. (It is similarly often extremely convenient to use
the myth of classical physics.) If such “probabilities” in the quantum world are
remembered to be purely mythical, than one can often simply use the ordinary
many-worlds interpretation with some arbitrary choice of the set of possibilities,
without worrying about the arbitrariness of this choice. A different choice would
merely give a different set of mythical probabilities, useful perhaps for approximating
the true probabilities for some different sets of conscious perceptions. Only if the
probabilities are to be interpreted as something fundamental need one worry about
the ambiguity or ugliness in the choice in the set of possibilities.
After writing this section, I heard Coleman’s beautiful lecture, “Quantum Me-
chanics in Your Face” [20], a rerun of his 1993 Dirac Memorial Lecture with a more
censored title [21], which argues for “NO special measurement process, NO reduc-
tion of the wavefunction, NO indeterminacy, NOTHING probabilistic in quantum
mechanics.” Coleman further states that a interaction of an infinite set of spins with
a measuring device can lead to “a definite deterministic state, definitely a random
sequence.” (See the forthcoming [22] for a proof of this.) He argues that it is a mis-
take to call the Everett interpretation “many worlds” and prefers that it be called
the “unitarian interpretation” of quantum mechanics.
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The present paper agrees with this viewpoint for the unconscious quantum world,
though Albert’s summary [23] (p. 124) of Newman’s argument against “the bare the-
ory” persuades me that we need something like probabilities (e.g., in the “frequency”
sense) for perceptions in the conscious world to explain what is typical about our
experience. For example, if I imagine a perception of remembering having thrown
two million fair coins and knowing how many came up heads, I would expect a
typical such perception to have a memory of getting within a few thousand of one
million heads rather than of getting merely a few thousand heads total, even though
I would expect there to be nonzero amplitudes for both sets of corresponding brain
states. Unfortunately, showing that tossing an infinite number of coins may under
suitable circumstances (fair coins, etc.) definitely lead to a random infinite sequence
of heads or tails [22] does not seem to help explain the experience we have with fi-
nite sequences, since any finite sequence can be the beginning of an infinite random
sequence.
One might accept that we do need something beyond bare quantum mechanics to
predict that our actual finite measurement results are typical but object to appealing
to consciousness to do that. This might be a valid objection if all we are trying to
explain can be described purely without reference to consciousness. But the idea
of Sensible Quantum Mechanics is not that one needs to consider consciousness
in order to provide a suitable interpretation of the unconscious quantum world
(which I believe is adequately described by the bare “unitarian” theory that Coleman
advocates), but rather that one needs to consider consciousness precisely when one
is seeking to explain properties of conscious experiences themselves.
3 Axioms of Sensible Quantum Mechanics
Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) is given by the following three basic pos-
tulates or axioms:
Quantum World Axiom: The unconscious “quantum world” Q is completely
described by an appropriate algebra of operators and by a suitable state σ (a positive
linear functional of the operators) giving the expectation value 〈O〉 ≡ σ[O] of each
operator O.
Conscious World Axiom: The “conscious world”M , the set of all perceptions
p, has a fundamental measure µ(S) for each subset S of M .
Quantum-Consciousness Connection: The measure µ(S) for each set S of
conscious perceptions is given by the expectation value of a corresponding “aware-
ness operator” A(S), a positive-operator-valued (POV) measure [24], in the state σ
of the quantum world:
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 ≡ σ[A(S)]. (2)
The Quantum World Axiom is here deliberately vague as to the precise nature of
the algebra of operators and of the state, because as the details of various quantum
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theories of the universe are being developed, I do not want the general framework
of Sensible Quantum Mechanics at this time to be made too restrictive. For exam-
ple, SQM is not designed necessarily to exclude the possibility that the operators
may be the pairs of multi-time (or even more general) class operators (or perhaps
even arbitrary linear combinations of them) in the decohering histories approach
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19], with the expectation values being given by
decoherence functionals, even though SQM does reject as mythical the usual prob-
ability interpretation given these functionals for the unconscious quantum world.
In the Conscious World Axiom and elsewhere in this paper, a perception p is
taken to mean all that one is consciously aware of or consciously experiencing at one
moment (or, more strictly, the entirety of a single conscious experience). Lockwood,
in a book expressing remarkably similar ideas to those that I initially arrived at
independently [25], calls p a “phenomenal perspective” or “maximal experience.” It
could also be expressed as a total “raw feel” that one has at once. It can include
components such as a visual sensation, an auditory sensation, a pain, a conscious
memory, a conscious impression of a thought or belief, etc., but it does not include
a sequence of more than one immediate perception that in other proposals might be
considered to be strung together to form a stream of consciousness of an individual
mind.
I should emphasize that by a perception, I mean the phenomenal, first-person,
subjective experience, and not the processes in the brain (which I call quantum,
even if they are accurately described classically) that accompany these subjective
phenenomena. In his first chapter, Chalmers [4] gives an excellent discussion of the
distinction between the former, which he calls the phenomenal concept of mind, and
the latter, which he calls the psychological concept of mind. In his language, what I
mean by a perception (and by other approximate synonyms that I might use, such
as sensation or awareness) is the phenomenal concept, and not the psychological
one.
I should perhaps also emphasize that each perception p has a unique character
given by its content (including its qualia), so, by definition, there are no pairs of
different perceptions with precisely the same character. In this way perceptions are
different from the interpretation of points of a connected manifold in general rela-
tivity, since there the points are all equivalent (e.g., under active diffeomorphisms)
until one lays down suitably inhomogeneous fields on the manifold that can then be
used to distinguish the points. In contrast, for the setM of perceptions, the individ-
ual perceptions p are assumed to be distinguished entirely by their content before
any other structures are laid down, such as the measure µ(S) for each subset S of
M . The appropriate description of the distinguishing features of each perception
appears to be a difficult problem that I am generally leaving aside from my discus-
sion of the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, so in this way my discussion
is definitely incomplete. For my purposes here, I am merely assuming that such
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a distinction between all different perceptions p can in principle be given (though
perhaps not in practice by any conscious being within our universe).
The Quantum-Consciousness Connection Axiom states my assumption of the
structure of what might be called the ‘psychophysical laws,’ the laws that presum-
ably give the ‘neural correlates of consciousness.’ This axiom, when combined with
the other two, gives what to me seems to be the simplest and most conservative
framework for “bridging principles that link the physical facts with consciousness”
and for stating “the connection at the level of ‘Brain state X produces conscious
state Y’ for a vast collection of complex physical states and associated experiences”
[4] in language that is consistent with a quantum theory having “NO special mea-
surement process, NO reduction of the wavefunction, NO indeterminacy” [21, 20] (in
particular, with a many-perceptions variant of Everett’s quantum theory, in which
measures for sets of conscious perceptions are added to the bare unitary quantum
theory that Coleman advocates).
Of course, the Quantum-Consciousness Connection Axiom, like the Quantum
world Axiom, is here also deliberately vague, because I do not have a detailed
theory of consciousness, but only a framework for fitting it with quantum theory.
My suggestion is that any theory of consciousness that is not inconsistent with
bare quantum theory should be formulated within this framework (unless a better
framework can be found, of course). I am also suspicious of any present detailed
theory that purports to say precisely under what conditions in the quantum world
would consciousness occur, since it seems that we simply don’t know yet. I feel that
present detailed theories may be analogous to the cargo cults of the South Pacific
after World War II, in which an incorrect theory was adopted, that aircraft with
goods would land simply if airfields and towers were built.
Since all sets S of perceptions with µ(S) > 0 really occur in the framework
of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, it is completely deterministic if the quantum state
and the A(S) are determined: there are no random or truly probabilistic elements in
SQM. Nevertheless, because the framework has measures for sets of perceptions, one
can readily use them to calculate quantities that can be interpreted as conditional
probabilities. One can consider sets of perceptions S1, S2, etc., defined in terms of
properties of the perceptions. For example, S1 might be the set of perceptions in
which there is a conscious memory of having tossed a coin one hundred times, and
S2 might be the set of perceptions in which there is a conscious memory of getting
more than seventy heads. Then one can interpret
P (S2|S1) ≡ µ(S1 ∩ S2)/µ(S1) (3)
as the conditional probability that the perception is in the set S2, given that it is
in the set S1. In our example, this would be the conditional probability that a
perception included a conscious memory of getting more than seventy heads, given
that it included a conscious memory of having tossed a coin one hundred times.
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An analogue of this conditional “probability” is the conditional probability that
a person in early 1997 is the Queen of England. If we consider a model of all the five
to six billion people, including the Queen, that we agree to consider as living humans
on Earth in 1997, then at the basic level of this model the Queen certainly exists in
it; there is nothing random or probabilistic about her existence. But if the model
weights each of the five to six billion people equally, then one can in a manner of
speaking say that the conditional probability that one of these persons is the Queen
is somewhat less than 2×10−10. I am proposing that it is in the same manner of
speaking that one can assign conditional probabilities to sets of perceptions, even
though there is nothing truly random about them at the basic level.
Another analogue one could give for the meaning of the measures of perceptions
postulated in Sensible Quantum Mechanics (particularly when they are incommen-
surate) is the following picture, not to be taken literally, but to be taken as an aid
for conceptualizing the measure: Assume for simplicity that the total measure for
all perceptions is finite, and assume that the number of perceptions is countable.
Then imagine that God moves His finger across each perception, staying at each
one so that it occurs for a “time” that is proportional to the measure. Of course
this “time” should not be confused with any physical time within our universe, or
with any conscious awareness of time within any of the perceptions, but it should
merely used as a picture for a continuous variable that can illustrate the measure.
The picture is then that the measure for perceptions may be viewed as somewhat
analogous to the measure of time used for calculating time averages in dynamical
systems, for example.
As it is defined by the three basic axioms above, Sensible Quantum Mechanics
is a framework and not a complete theory for the universe, since it would need to
be completed by giving the detailed algebra of operators and state of the quantum
world, the set of all possible perceptions of the conscious world, and the awareness
operators A(S) for the subsets of possible perceptions, whose quantum expectation
values are the measures for these subsets.
Furthermore, even if such a complete theory were found, it would not necessarily
be the final theory of the universe, since one would like to systematize the connection
between the elements given above. As Chalmers eloquently puts it on pages 214-15
of his book [4], “An ultimate theory will not leave the connection at the level of
‘Brain state X produces conscious state Y’ for a vast collection of complex physical
states and associated experiences. Instead, it will systematize this connection via
an underlying explanatory framework, specifying simple underlying laws in virtue of
which the connection holds. Physics does not content itself with being a mere mass of
observations about the positions, velocities, and charges of various objects at various
times; it systematizes these observations and shows how they are consequences of
underlying laws, where the underlying laws are as simple and as powerful as possible.
The same should hold of a theory of consciousness. We should seek to explain the
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supervenience of consciousness upon the physical in terms of the simplest possible
set of laws.
“Ultimately, we will wish for a set of fundamental laws. Physicists seek a set of
basic laws simple enough that one might write them on the front of a T-shirt; in
a theory of consciousness, we should expect the same thing. In both cases, we are
questing for the basic structure of the universe, and we have good reason to believe
that the basic structure has a remarkable simplicity. The discovery of fundamental
laws may be a distant goal, however. . . .
“When we finally have fundamental theories of physics and consciousness in
hand, we may have what truly counts as a theory of everything. The fundamental
physical laws will explain the character of physical processes; the psychophysical
laws will explain the conscious experiences that are associated; and everything else
will be a consequence.”
Returning to the elements above of a postulated completed, but not necessarily
final, Sensible Quantum Mechanics theory, it is presently premature to try to give
these elements precisely, particularly the awareness operators that have generally
been left out of physics discussions. However, it might be helpful to hypothesize
certain simplifying forms that these awareness operators might have. Before doing
even that, it is useful to consider the structure of the set of all possible perceptions
and to postulate a prior measure for that set.
4 Hypotheses for a Prior Measure
I shall hypothesize that the set M of all possible conscious perceptions p is a
suitable topological space with a prior measure that I shall denote as
µ0(S) =
∫
S
dµ0(p). (4)
Then, because of the linearity of positive-valued-operator measures over sets, one
can write each awareness operator as
A(S) =
∫
S
E(p)dµ0(p), (5)
a generalized sum or integral of “experience operators” or “perception operators”
E(p) for the individual perceptions p in the set S. Similarly, one can write the
measure on a set of perceptions S as
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 =
∫
S
dµ(p) =
∫
S
m(p)dµ0(p), (6)
in terms of a measure density m(p) that is the quantum expectation value of the
experience operator E(p) for the same perception p:
m(p) = 〈E(p)〉 ≡ σ[E(p)]. (7)
12
Strictly speaking, the prior measure µ0(S) is not an essential part of a complete
Sensible Quantum Mechanics theory, since once the algebra of operators, the quan-
tum state, the set of perceptions, and the awareness operators are specified, the
theory is complete. However, since we do not yet have any precise knowledge of
these elements, the prior measure is a very helpful tool to use while postulating and
testing various hypotheses about these elements.
Perhaps the simplest hypothesis that one can make about the set M of all pos-
sible perceptions is that it is countably discrete. Such a class of Sensible Quantum
Mechanics theories with discrete perceptions may be labeled SQMD. This leads to
a natural prior measure
µ0D(S) = N(S) = number of perceptions in S. (8)
Then the “integrals” in Eqs. (4)-(6) are simply sums over the discrete perceptions
p that make up the set S.
In the alternative hypothesis of SQMC in which the set of all possible perceptions
forms a continuum, there is not such an obvious natural prior measure. If the
awareness operators are of trace class, one might choose
µ0CT (S) = Tr[A(S)], (9)
which is equivalent to requiring Tr[E(p)] = 1. This would be reasonable if the set of
possible quantum states formed a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, or perhaps if each
experience operator depended nontrivially upon all of the quantum system except
for a finite-dimensional subsystem, but these possibilities seems unduly restrictive,
so I am doubtful that µ0CT (S) and the resulting SQMCT is a realistic choice except
in toy models.
Another hypothesis that one might make in the case in whichM is a continuum is
to assume that there is a preferred prior state σ0 and then to take the prior measure
to be the measure given by the expectation values of the awareness operators in this
state (rather than in the actual state σ, which gives the true measure):
µ0P (S) = σ0[A(S)]. (10)
Such a subset of the SQMC theories might be labeled SQMCσ0. If the set of possible
quantum states forms a Hilbert space of finite dimension n, one might choose σ0 to
be the maximally mixed state, the one giving σ0[O] = Tr[O]/n for any operator O.
Then µ0P (S) would simply be µ0CT (S)/n. However, µ0P (S) could be defined in more
general situations in which µ0CT (S) is not definable, though in such situations there
might not be such a natural choice for σ0. It may be hard enough to find a simple
state σ for the quantum world of our universe that fits observations, without the
added difficulty of requiring also the specification of a prior state σ0. (In quantum
field theory in Minkowski spacetime, the Minkowski vacuum would appear to be a
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natural choice for σ0, but finding a state σ in that framework consistent with our
observations seems nontrivial. When one includes gravitation, the situation seems
reversed in that there may be a certain natural choices for σ [26, 27, 28, 29, 30], but
then one seems to lose the Minkowski vacuum as a natural choice for σ0.)
Yet another hypothesis one might make for the prior measure σ0 in the continuous
case is that it is given by the Riemannian volume element
µ0R(S) =
∫
S
g1/2(p)dnp (11)
of a Riemannian metric on the set of set M of all perceptions. If one took the set
of experience operators E(p) as basic rather than the awareness operators A(S) to
be derived from them by Eq. (5), one might define the Riemannian metric to be
gijdp
idpj = ReTr{[E(pi + dpi)− E(pi)][E(pj + dpj)− E(pj)]} (12)
if this is both finite and nondegenerate. In such a case both the prior measure
µ0R(S) and the awareness operators A(S) would follow from a single suitable set
of experience operators E(p). One might label such a family of Sensible Quantum
Mechanics theories SQMCR, the final R denoting the Riemannian metric (12) and
the corresponding prior volume element µ0R(S).
5 Hypotheses for Experience Operators
After one has chosen a suitable prior volume element µ0(S) so that one then
can derive the awareness operators A(S) from the experience operators E(p), one
can formulate various hypotheses for the latter. Clearly, one could get any measure
density m(p) one wanted from Eq. (7) applied to any arbitrary quantum state σ
simply by choosing E(p) = m(p)I, where I is the identity operator (so long as the
state σ satisfies the normalization requirement σ[I] ≡ 〈I〉 = 1). However, this would
put no burden of the explanation of the measure of perceptions onto the quantum
state. I strongly suspect that this would not lead to the simplest possible choice of
E(p)’s giving the correct measure density m(p), since presumably the actual quan-
tum state is a crucial element in the simplest complete description of even just the
conscious world. (Otherwise, since one’s perception in the conscious world is all one
can be aware of, why should one even postulate the existence of the quantum world?
Surely the justification we have for the postulate of the existence of the quantum
world is that such a postulate simplifies the explanation of the conscious world that
we directly experience. In this way the whole physical world, comprising both the
conscious world and the quantum world, related by the Quantum-Consciousness
Connection axiom, can be simpler than just the conscious world considered by it-
self. Whether the whole physical world is also simpler than just the quantum world
considered by itself is a question posed for the future; the fact that it does not seem
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to be so within our present level of understanding seems to me to be one of the main
reasons why consciousness has so far been largely banished from physics.)
One very natural requirement that we may wish to put on the experience oper-
ators is the following:
Pairwise Independence Hypothesis: E(p) and E(p′) are linearly indepen-
dent for two different perceptions, p 6= p′.
This would be sufficient to rule out the ad hoc proposal E(p) = m(p)I above in
which the quantum state would have no effect on the measure for perceptions. Of
course, it is much stronger than necessary for merely that purpose. It implies that
no two different perceptions have the same experience operator (or even the same up
to normalization). The Quantum-Consciousness Connection and the assumption of
a prior measure that leads to Eq. (5) says that there is a unique map from the set of
perceptions M in the conscious world to a subset of operators in the quantum world
that I am calling experience operators E(p); the Pairwise Independence Hypothesis
says that there is a unique inverse map from this subset of operators back to the set
of perceptions. These assumptions together provide a particular type of mind-body
unity that seems rather plausible (or at least relatively simple), though it certainly is
not logically necessary, and I doubt that there could even be any direct observational
evidence for it apart from appeals to simplicity.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, in the following I shall generally assume the
Pairwise Independence Hypothesis. Where necessary, Sensible Quantum Mechanics
with this additional assumption may be denoted SQMI (or SQMDI in the discrete
case, etc., skipping the P for “pairwise” to avoid confusion with the P below for
“projection”), though I shall generally just assume the Pairwise Independence Hy-
pothesis implicitly and not bother listing the I for it.
A related but much stronger hypothesis than the Pairwise Independence Hy-
pothesis is the following:
Linear Independence Hypothesis: The set of all the E(p)’s is a linearly
independent set. Such SQM theories may be labeled SQMLI.
If the E(p)’s are positive operators in a Hilbert space of finite complex dimension
N , then there are at most N2 linearly independent such operators, so that would be
the limit on the number of perceptions p in SQMLI in a finite-dimensional Hilbert
space. This may be a plausible restriction, but since it does not seem to be necessary,
and since I do not see too much other motivation for the Linear Independence
Hypothesis (except as a possible consequence of other hypotheses that I may wish
to consider), I shall not generally assume it but shall only implicitly assume the
Pairwise Independence Hypothesis below when I speak in an unqualified way about
Sensible Quantum Mechanics.
Now one can turn to more particular assumptions about the structure of the
experience operators. One of the simplest hypotheses one can make about them is
that they are projection operators:
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Projection Hypothesis: E(p) = P (p), a projection operator that depends on
the perception p.
Such forms of Sensible Quantum Mechanics can be denoted by attaching the
letter P to the abbreviation. Thus the general form of SQM with the Projection
Hypothesis added is SQMP (or SMQIP if it is necessary to show explicitly that
the projection operators are all assumed to be different for different perceptions);
the form with a discrete set of perceptions (each with its own projection operator)
would be SQMDP (or SQMDIP); the form with a continuum of perceptions with
the prior measure given by the volume element of the Riemannian metric (12) would
be SQMCRP (or SQMCRIP); etc.
The Projection Hypothesis appears to be a specific mathematical realization of
part of Lockwood’s proposal [25] (p. 215), that “a phenomenal perspective [what
I have here been calling simply a perception p] may be equated with a shared
eigenstate of some preferred (by consciousness) set of compatible brain observables.”
Here I have expressed the “equating” by Eqs. (2) and (5), and presumably the
“shared eigenstate” can be expressed by a corresponding projection operator P (p).
I should also emphasize that if the same conscious perception is produced by
several different orthogonal “eigenstates of consciousness” (e.g., different states of a
brain and surroundings that give rise to the same perception p), then in the Projec-
tion Hypothesis the projection operator P (p) would be a sum of the corresponding
rank-one projection operators and so would be a projection operator of rank higher
than unity. This is what I would expect, since surely the surroundings could be
different and yet the appropriate part of the brain, if unchanged, would lead to
the same perception. On the other hand, if E(p) were a sum of noncommuting
projection operators corresponding to nonorthogonal states, or a weighted sum of
projection operators with weights different from unity, then generically E(p) would
not be a projection operator P (p) as assumed in the Projection Hypothesis.
If one has a constrained system, such as a closed universe in general relativity,
the quantum state may obey certain constraint equations, such as the Wheeler-
DeWitt equations. The projection operators P (p) of perceptions in the Projection
Hypothesis may not commute with these constraints, in which case they may give
technically ‘unphysical’ states when applied to the quantum state. But so long
as their expectation values can be calculated and are nonnegative real numbers,
that is sufficient for giving the perception measure density m(p). What it means is
that in the Projection Hypothesis, the perception operators should be considered as
projection operators in the space of unconstrained states, even though the actual
physical state does obey the constraints.
Alternatively, if one wishes to write the perception operators E(p) as operators
within the space of constrained states, the Projection Hypothesis could be modified
to the following assumption to give perception operators E(p) that commute with
the constraints and so keep the state ‘physical’:
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Constrained Projection Hypothesis: E(p) = PCP (p)PC , where PC is a
projection operator within the space of unconstrained states that takes any state to
a corresponding constrained state, and P (p) is a projection operator in the space of
unconstrained states that depends on the perception p.
One might label such theories SQMP(C), SQMDP(C), SQMCRP(C), etc., where
the C for “constrained” is put in parentheses to indicate that it modifies the P
and to distinguish it from a possible earlier C for “continuum” or a later one for
“commuting” (see below).
One can also get something like the Constrained Projection Hypothesis, say
the Symmetrized Projection Hypothesis, even for unconstrained systems if
they have symmetries (e.g., the Poincare´ symmetries of quantum field theory in a
classical Minkowski spacetime, though one would not expect these symmetries to
survive when one includes gravity), since one might then expect that E(p) should
be invariant under the symmetry group with elements g. Then if one starts with a
projection operator P (p) that is not invariant under the action of each group element,
say P (p) 6= gP (p)g−1, then one might expect E(p) to be proportional to the sum or
integral of gP (p)g−1 over the group elements g, so that E(p) = gE(p)g−1. Unless
all these different gP (p)g−1’s are orthogonal (which does not appear possible for a
continuous symmetry group), the resulting E(p) will generically not be a projection
operator, but it can be said to have arisen from one. Such theories might be labeled
SQMP(S), SQMDP(S), SQMCRP(S), etc.
One might prefer to make an even more restrictive assumption and strengthen
the Projection Hypothesis to the Linearly Independent Projection Hypothesis, the
Commuting Projection Hypothesis or, stronger yet, the Orthogonal Projection Hy-
pothesis:
Linearly Independent Projection Hypothesis: E(p) = P (p), with the set
of all these P (p)’s being a linearly independent set. (This combination of the Pro-
jection Hypothesis with the Linear Independence Hypothesis is much stronger than
the combination of the Projection Hypothesis with the now-implicit Pairwise In-
dependence Hypothesis given earlier above, which merely requires that each pair
of different E(p)’s be linearly independent.) Such SQM theories may be labeled
SQMLIP.
Commuting Projection Hypothesis: E(p) = P (p), with [P (p), P (p′)] = 0
for all pairs of perceptions p and p′. Such SQM theories may be labeled SQMPC,
putting the C for “commuting” after the P for “projection.”
Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis: E(p) = P (p), with P (p)P (p′) = 0 for
all pairs of different perceptions p 6= p′. Such SQM theories (a subset of the SQMPC
theories) may analogously be labeled SQMPO. Unlike the Projection Hypothesis and
the Commuting Projection Hypothesis by themselves, the Orthogonal Projection
Hypothesis obviously implies the Pairwise Independence Hypothesis and the Linear
Independence Hypothesis.
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The Commuting Projection Hypothesis and the Orthogonal Projection Hypoth-
esis allow one to define measures on pairs of perceptions that have nice properties.
However, such joint measures are not fundamental to SQM and may be viewed as
analogous to yet another case of mythical probabilities. Therefore, the possibility
of their definition in SQMPC and SQMPO theories does not seem to me to be a
strong argument in favor of such restriction of SQMP theories.
Another direction one can go in hypothesizing properties of experience operators
is to make the following assumption about the structure of each perception (which,
as defined above, is all that one is aware of at once, or all of a single conscious
experience):
Assumption of Perception Components: Each perception p itself consists of
a set of discrete components ci(p) contained within the perception, say p = {ci(p)}.
Different perceptions p may share various components in common, but at least some
components must differ in order that the perceptions themselves differ.
Because of the apparent unity of perception, the Assumption of Perception Com-
ponents seems likely to be more of an approximation for certain aspects of percep-
tions than a general truth. In other words, there may not be any fundamental
decomposition of perceptions into components. However, there are cases in which it
appears to be a reasonably good approximation, such as for a perception with one
component being a conscious memory of having tossed a coin one hundred times,
and with another component being a conscious memory of getting more than seventy
heads.
If one does make the Assumption of Perception Components, perhaps just as an
approximation for certain aspects of a perception that are easy to describe, it may
be natural to make the following extension of the Projection Hypothesis:
Product Projection Hypothesis: E(p) =
∏
i P [ci(p)], where each P [ci(p)] is
a projection operator that depends on the perception component ci(p), with all the
P [ci(p)]’s commuting for the same p. The corresponding theories, subsets of those
obeying the Projection Hypothesis, can be labeled by a double PP replacing the
single P.
One can also strengthen the Product Projection Hypothesis in ways analogous
to those in which the Projection Hypothesis were strengthened above:
Commuting Product Projection Hypothesis: E(p) =
∏
i P [ci(p)], where
each P [ci(p)] is a projection operator that depends on the perception component
ci(p), with all the P [ci(p)]’s commuting (i.e., for all different p’s, as well as for all
ci(p)’s with the same p as in the Product Projection Hypothesis itself). The resulting
theories may be labeled SQMPPC.
Orthogonal Product Projection Hypothesis: E(p) = P (p) =
∏
i P [ci(p)],
with all the P [ci(p)]’s commuting, and with P (p)P (p
′) = 0 for all pairs of different
perceptions p 6= p′. In other words, each pair of different perceptions has at least
one corresponding pair of different components whose corresponding projection op-
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erators are orthogonal. Like the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis, the Orthogonal
Product Projection Hypothesis implies both the Pairwise Independence Hypothesis
and the Linear Independence Hypothesis. Such theories may be labeled SQMPPO.
After discussing all of these stronger hypotheses that one might add to the Pro-
jection Hypothesis (or to one of its slight variants, such as the Constrained Projection
Hypothesis or the Symmetrized Projection Hypothesis), I should say that one might
prefer to stop at an even weaker hypothesis, such as the following:
Sequence of Projections Hypothesis: E(p) = C†(p)C(p), where
C(p) = P (p, n)P (p, n− 1) · · ·P (p, 2)P (p, 1) is a product of a sequence of (possibly
noncommuting) projection operators (or a “homogeneous history”), with the integer
n and the projection operators P (p, i) all depending on the perception p. Such
theories can be labeled by adding S to the previous abbreviation (as P is added for
theories obeying the Projection Hypothesis). Note that when n = 1, SQMS reduces
to SQMP.
For n > 1, one might prefer to restrict the sequences to those which obeys
the conditions of “consistent histories” [8, 9]. Thus one might make the following
restriction:
Consistent Sequence of Projections Hypothesis: The Sequence of Projec-
tions Hypothesis holds, and the set of all experience operators E(p) forms a subset
of a single set of consistent histories, that is, a set of histories with the property that,
for each pair of distinct sequences C(p) and C(p′) such that Cˆ(p, p′) = C(p) +C(p′)
is also a homogeneous history (a product of a sequence of projection operators),
σ[Cˆ(p, p′)†Cˆ(p, p′)] = σ[C†(p)C(p)] + σ[C†(p′)C(p′)]. Such a theory can be labeled
SQMSC.
An example obeying the Sequence of Projections Hypothesis would be the case in
which the individual projection operators are those of the components ci(p) of the
perception p. However, if these projection operators are actually noncommuting,
contrary to the Product Projection Hypothesis above, it may not be clear what
fixes the order of the sequence. For example, it would not seem natural to try to
impose any time ordering, since the perception is all that one is aware of “at once”
and so might be interpreted as happening at one time. One might try to order the
components of a perception that are interpreted as memories by the order in the
time at which the events remembered are felt to have happened, but this seems very
imprecise in many cases and certainly would not seem to apply to the components
of a perception that are felt to be present sensations of concurrent events.
Histories Hypothesis: E(p) = C(p)†C(p), where each C(p) is a (possibly one-
term) sum (with unit coefficients) of products of sequences of projection operators.
Such theories can be labeled by adding H instead of P or S to the previous abbrevi-
ation. SQMH is a further generalization of SQMP than SQMS is; SQMP is a subset
of SQMS, which is itself a subset of SQMH.
Just as one might like to restrict the sequences of projection operators in SQMS
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to consistent histories, so one might analogously want to restrict the C’s in SQMH
to one or another of the “decoherent histories” requirements [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19]:
Individually Weak Decoherent Histories Hypothesis: The Histories Hy-
pothesis holds, with each C(p) being a member of a weak decoherent set of histories
consisting of C(p) and I −C(p). That is, σ[C(p)†C(p)] = Reσ[C(p)]. Such theories
may be called SQMHIWD.
Individually Medium Decoherent Histories Hypothesis: The Histories
Hypothesis holds, with each C(p) being a member of a medium decoherent set of
histories consisting of C(p) and I − C(p). That is, σ[C(p)†C(p)] = σ[C(p)]. This
version of SQMH may be called SQMHIMD.
Individually Strong Decoherent Histories Hypothesis: The Histories Hy-
pothesis holds, with each C(p) being a member of a strong decoherent set of histories
consisting of C(p) and I − C(p). That is, there exists a projection operator P (p)
such that σ[OC(p)] = σ[OP (p)] for any operator O. This is SQMHISD.
Weak Decoherent Histories Hypothesis: The Histories Hypothesis holds,
with the C(p)’s forming part of a weak decoherent set of histories. That is,
Reσ[C(p)†C(p′)] = 0 for p 6= p′. This would be SQMHWD.
Medium Decoherent Histories Hypothesis: The Histories Hypothesis holds,
with the C(p)’s forming part of a medium decoherent set of histories. That is,
σ[C(p)†C(p′)] = 0 for p 6= p′. This can be labeled SQMHMD.
Strong Decoherent Histories Hypothesis: The Histories Hypothesis holds,
with the C(p)’s forming part of a strong decoherent set of histories. That is, there
exists a set of orthogonal projection operators P (p), a distinct one for each distinct
perception p, such that σ[OC(p)] = σ[OP (p)] for any operator O. This may be
denoted SQMHSD.
In addition to these various forms of the Histories Hypothesis, one can also
consider the extension to Linearly Positive Histories [19]:
Linearly Positive Histories Hypothesis: E(p) = ReC(p), where each C(p)
is a sum of one or more products of sequences of projection operators such that
σ[ReC(p)] ≥ 0. Such theories, SQMLPH, unlike the previous versions of the His-
tories Hypothesis, are not necessarily subsets of SQMH. However, they give the
same measure densities m(p) as SQMHIWD or its subsets SQMHIMD, SQMHISD,
SQMHWD, SQMHMD, or SQMHSD when the C(p)’s obey the corresponding more
restrictive conditions of those theories [19].
It is certainly logically possible that perceptions might depend on histories (char-
acterized by C’s that are sums of products of sequences of generically noncommuting
projection operators) rather than on events (characterized by individual projection
operators) that one could consider localized on hypersurfaces of constant time if
the quantum world has such a time. However, as a previous advocate of the “mar-
velous moment” approach to quantum mechanics in which only quantities on one
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such hypersurface can be tested [31], I find it more believable to assume that per-
ceptions are caused by brain states which could be at one moment of time if there
are such things in the physical world. The generalization of this hypothesis to the
case in which there may not be a well-defined physical time leads me personally
to prefer adopting the Projection Hypothesis (or perhaps the Constrained Projec-
tion Hypothesis for constrained systems) rather than stopping at the Sequence of
Projections Hypothesis or the Histories Hypothesis, though of course the general
framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics is broad enough to encompass any of
these more specific hypotheses.
On the other hand, I am not myself convinced that the evidence strongly suggests
going beyond the Projection Hypothesis to the Commuting Projection Hypothesis,
the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis, the Product Projection Hypothesis, or any of
the restrictions of the latter, though it would certainly be worth investigating these
more specific hypotheses to see whether one of them might indeed lead to a simple
complete theory that is consistent with our experience. Some of the properties
implied by these various hypotheses will be discussed in more detail in the section
below on toy models.
While I am considering hypotheses weaker than the Projection Hypothesis, it
might be worth listing a few other very weak requirements, restricting only the
normalization of the experience operators E(p), that nevertheless would generally
be sufficient to exclude the ad hoc proposal E(p) = m(p)I:
Constant-Maximum-Normalization Hypothesis: The expectation value of
each E(p) has a constant maximum value, say unity, in the set of all states σ that are
normalized to give σ[I] = 1. This weaker hypothesis would be a consequence of the
Projection Hypothesis but of course does not imply the Projection Hypothesis. Such
theories could be called SQMNCM, putting the initial for “normalization” before
that of its modifiers.
Unit-Normalization Hypothesis: Tr[E(p)] = 1 for each experience operator.
This is a consequence of Eq. (9) for SQMCT or SQMDT, but it is not consistent
with the Projection Hypothesis unless all the projection operators P (p) are of rank
one, which seems extremely implausible. These theories would be SQMNU.
Projection-Normalization Hypothesis: Each experience operator is normal-
ized so that Tr[E(p)] = Tr[E(p)E(p)]. This is a consequence (at least if E(p) is
of trace class so that the left side of this normalization condition is defined) of the
Projection Hypothesis, since then E(p) = E(p)E(p). Such theories might be labeled
SQMNP. However, the trace-class condition on E(p) that seems necessary for im-
posing the Projection-Normalization Hypothesis seems unrealistic to impose if the
quantum system has an infinite number of states.
Finally, for comparison’s sake, let me describe some hypotheses that would take
one outside Sensible Quantum Mechanics itself, as I have defined it by the three
axioms above, by violating the particular Quantum-Consciousness Connection ax-
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iom given by Eq. (2). These broader alternative hypotheses would give the measure
µ(S) on sets S of perceptions as nonlinear functionals of the quantum state. For
example, one might set
µ(S) =
∫
S
f [p,m(p)]dµ0(p) ≡
∫
S
f(p, 〈E(p)〉)dµ0(p) ≡
∫
S
f(p, σ[E(p)])dµ0(p), (13)
where f is some arbitrary nonnegative finite function, depending possibly upon the
perception p itself, of its other argument, the nonnegative number m(p). The sim-
plest class would be those in which the function is purely of m(p), i.e., f [p,m(p)] =
f [m(p)]. A simple set of examples would be to set f [m(p)] = m(p)n for some posi-
tive constant n. Such extensions of Sensible Quantum Mechanics might be labeled
SQMf, or SQMn in the case in which f is the power-law function. Of course, SQM1,
the case in which the power is n = 1, is ordinary Sensible Quantum Mechanics,
which is what I shall henceforth assume unless explicitly stated otherwise.
One can see that there are many possible characteristics for the general form of
the experience operators in Sensible Quantum Mechanics or its extensions SQMf.
From one viewpoint this merely illustrates the incompleteness of the bare framework
of SQM, but in a slightly different way of looking at it, it shows part of the enormous
gap of our knowledge about consciousness, even within this one framework, which
itself is merely a proposal.
6 Sensible Classical Mechanics
For illustrative purposes, it may be helpful to note that one could have a rather
similar relation between consciousness and mechanics even if mechanics were classi-
cal. Then one might propose a theory of Sensible Classical Mechanics (SCM) with
the following three axioms analogous to those proposed above for Sensible Quantum
Mechanics:
Classical World Axiom: The unconscious “classical world” C is completely
described by an appropriate set of classical histories and by a particular history h
within that set.
Conscious World Axiom: The “conscious world”M , the set of all perceptions
p, has a fundamental measure µ(S) for each subset S of M .
Classical-Consciousness Connection: The measure µ(S) for each set S of
conscious perceptions is given by the value of a corresponding “classical awareness
functional” AC(S), a positive functional, linear in the set S of histories, evaluated
for the specific history h of the classical world:
µ(S) = AC(S)[h]. (14)
Just as in SQM, so also in SCM one might postulate that the setM of perceptions
p forms a suitable topological space with a prior measure given by Eq. (4) and then
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set
AC(S) =
∫
S
EC(p)dµ0(p), (15)
a generalized sum or integral of “classical experience operators” or “classical per-
ception operators” EC(p) for the individual perceptions p. Then one could use the
relevant part of Eq. (6) to define the measure density m(p) as
m(p) = EC(p)[h], (16)
the analogue of Eq. (7) above.
In some forms of Sensible Classical Mechanics, one might take the set of classical
histories to be time-parametrized trajectories, obeying some set of classical equa-
tions of motion, in some phase space. Then one might take the value of a classical
awareness functional AC(S)[h] to be a time integral, along the trajectory of the ac-
tual history h in the phase space, of some positive function of the phase space that
is linear in S. For example, EC(p)[h] could be the time integral, along the history
h, of a suitable delta-function of the phase space, so that each perception has a
particular corresponding point of the phase space and so that the measure density
m(p) is, say, unity if the trajectory of the actual history h goes through the point
in the phase space corresponding to the perception p and is zero otherwise.
Then if the set of all perceptions were homeomorphic to some subset of the
phase space, and if the correspondence between each perception and its correspond-
ing point of this subset of the phase space were a homeomorphism, then an actual
classical history passing through the subset of the phase space would give a corre-
sponding one-parameter trajectory though the set of all perceptions. This is indeed
what one might na¨ıvely expect in a classical model for a single conscious being hav-
ing a continuous temporal sequence of perceptions, but even within SCM one could
certainly have many different variants of this simple example. (For example, one
would probably want to allow for more than one conscious being, so that appropriate
points of the phase space would correspond to several conscious perceptions, say one
for each conscious being that existed at that point of the phase space.) However,
I shall not bother listing various detailed possibilities as I did above for the more
realistic possibility of Sensible Quantum Mechanics.
Sensible Classical Mechanics seems rather moot, since the unconscious “mechan-
ical” part of the physical world appears to be quantum rather classical. However, I
give it mainly to show that the connection I am proposing between the mechanical
and the conscious aspects of the world is not strongly dependent upon the quantum
nature of mechanics, though the detailed mathematical form of the connection does
depend upon the mathematical form of the description of the mechanics. (Contrast
[32] for an opposing viewpoint in which the form of the mechanics is considered cru-
cial.) In other words, if it turns out that a classical approximation is adequate for
the mechanics of the brain that leads to consciousness, then there would not seem to
be any fundamental problem with using a particular SCM as an approximation to
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the appropriate SQM. For example, if SQM is correct and the experience operators
E(p) are approximately projection operators onto certain brain configurations that
can be described classically to a good approximation, then a SCM with perceptions
corresponding to the regions of phase space with those brain configurations would
presumably be a good approximation to at least that part of the SQM in which the
quantum state behaves according to the classical approximation for it.
Another use for Sensible Classical Mechanics might be in attaching a Sensible
theory of conscious perceptions to the de Broglie-Bohm theory of quantum mechan-
ics [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 23, 38, 39, 40, 1] in which there is not only the algebra of
operators and the quantum state, but also a classical history or de Broglie-Bohm tra-
jectory (albeit not one obeying the same equations of motion as that of the classical
approximation to the quantum theory). If SQM is applied to this theory according
to the rules above, then the measure for conscious perceptions would be completely
unaffected by the de Broglie-Bohm trajectory, so that this trajectory would have
absolutely no influence upon what is consciously experienced. (Thus my advocacy
of SQM leaves me with no personal motivation for augmenting quantum mechanics
with what would then be a totally unobservable de Broglie-Bohm trajectory.)
However, someone else who does believe in the existence of a de Broglie-Bohm
classical trajectory and who does believe it has an observable effect might thus choose
not to adopt SQM but might prefer to adopt some form of SCM with the history
given by the de Broglie-Bohm trajectory (giving, say, an SCMBB theory). Although
I myself would not advocate doing that, it seems that one must have something
similar in mind if one believes that a de Broglie-Bohm version of quantum mechanics
is in principle observationally different from quantum mechanics without the de
Broglie-Bohm trajectories. Nevertheless, the statistical predictions for perceptions
in this SCMBB theory could be similar to those of certain SQM theories in which the
experience operators are projection operators in configuration space, at least if one
averages over a suitable prior distribution for the unknown precise de Broglie-Bohm
trajectory of the former. Thus the observational difference that would be manifest
if one had access to the entire conscious world could very well not be sufficient
to make the two theories distinguishable by any single typical perception. Indeed,
many advocates of a de Broglie-Bohm version of quantum mechanics would say that
it is observationally indistinguishable from ordinary quantum mechanics. (See the
third paper of [1] for a further discussion of these points.)
After this interlude on how relating consciousness to classical mechanics need
not be all that different from relating it to quantum mechanics, I shall return to
the assumption that bare quantum mechanics is the correct framework for the me-
chanical aspects of the physical world and that Sensible Quantum Mechanics is the
correct framework for the combination of the mechanical and the conscious aspects.
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7 Perceptions rather than Minds
Another point I should emphasize is that in Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the
set M of perceptions is fundamental, but not any higher power of this set. Thus
there is a linear measure on subsets S of perceptions, which can be expressed as
the “integral” (6) (a discrete sum when the set M is discrete) of a measure density
m(p) times a prior measure element dµ0(p), but there is no nontrivial fundamental
measure density m(p1, p2, . . . , pn) on n-tuples of perceptions. Thus, for example,
there is no fundamental notion of a correlation between individual perceptions given
by any measure.
(On the other hand, if a perception can be broken up into component parts,
say c1 and c2, there can be a correlation between the parts, in the sense that the
measure µ(S1∩S2) for all perceptions in the set S1 containing the component c1 and
in the set S2 containing the component c2 need not be proportional to µ(S1)µ(S2),
the measure for all perceptions containing c1 times the measure for all perceptions
containing c2. The enormous structure in a single perception seems to suggest that
such correlations within perceptions are highly nontrivial, but I see no evidence
for ascribing any fundamental meaning to a nontrivial correlation between complete
perceptions p, since no two different complete perceptions can be perceived together.)
In saying that SQM posits no fundamental correlation between complete per-
ceptions, I do not mean that it is impossible to define such correlations from the
mathematics, but only that I do not see any fundamental physical meaning for such
mathematically-defined correlations. As an example of how such a correlation might
be defined, consider that if a perception operator E(p) is a projection operator, and
the quantum state of the universe is represented by the pure state |ψ〉, one can
ascribe to the perception p the pure Everett “relative state”
|p〉 = E(p)|ψ〉‖ E(p)|ψ〉 ‖ =
E(p)|ψ〉
〈ψ|E(p)E(p)|ψ〉1/2 . (17)
Alternatively, if the quantum state of the universe is represented by the density
matrix ρ, one can associate the perception with a relative density matrix
ρp =
E(p)ρE(p)
Tr[E(p)ρE(p)]
. (18)
Either of these formulas can be applied when the perception operator is not a pro-
jection operator, but then the meaning is not necessarily so clear.
Then if one is willing to say that m(p) = Tr[E(p)ρ] is the absolute probability
for the perception p (which might seem natural at least when E(p) is a projection
operator, though I am certainly not advocating this na¨ıve interpretation), one might
also na¨ıvely interpret Tr[E(p′)ρp] as the conditional probability of the perception p
′
given the perception p.
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Another thing one can do with two perceptions p and p′ is to calculate an “overlap
fraction” between them as
f(p, p′) =
〈E(p)E(p′)〉〈E(p′)E(p)〉
〈E(p)E(p)〉〈E(p′)E(p′)〉 . (19)
If the quantum state of the universe is pure, this is the same as the overlap prob-
ability between the two Everett relative states corresponding to the perceptions:
f(p, p′) = |〈p|p′〉|2. Thus one might in some sense say that if f(p, p′) is near unity,
the two perceptions are in nearly the same one of the Everett “many worlds,” but
if f(p, p′) is near zero, the two perceptions are in nearly orthogonal different worlds.
However, this is just a manner of speaking, since I do not wish to say that the
quantum state of the universe is really divided up into many different worlds. In a
slightly different way of putting it, one might also propose that f(p, p′), instead of
Tr[E(p′)ρp], be interpreted as the conditional probability of the perception p
′ given
the perception p. Still, I do not see any evidence that f(p, p′) should be interpreted
as a fundamental element of Sensible Quantum Mechanics. In any case, one can be
conscious only of a single perception at once, so there is no way in principle that
one can test any properties of joint perceptions such as f(p, p′).
An amusing property of both of these “conditional probabilities” for one per-
ception given another is that they would both always be zero if the Orthogonal
Projection Hypothesis were true. Even though the resulting SQMPO theory would
generally be a “many-perceptions” theory, it could be interpreted as being rather
solipsistic in the sense that in the relative density matrix ρp corresponding to my
present perception, no other perceptions would occur in it with nonzero measure!
This has the appearance of being somewhat unpalatable, and might be taken to
be an argument against adopting the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis (and hence
perhaps for stopping at the Commuting Projection Hypothesis, or perhaps the Com-
muting Product Projection Hypothesis if one adopts the Assumption of Perception
Components, as the strongest reasonable hypothesis), but it is not clear to me that
this is actually strong evidence against the Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis.
In addition to the fact that Sensible Quantum Mechanics postulates no funda-
mental notion of any correlation between individual perceptions, it also postulates
no fundamental equivalence relation on the set of perceptions. For example, the
measure gives no way of classifying different perceptions as to whether they belong
to the same conscious being (e.g., at different times) or to different conscious beings.
The most reasonable such classification would seem to be by the content (including
the qualia) of the perceptions themselves, which distinguish the perceptions, so that
no two different perceptions, p 6= p′, have the same content. Based upon my own
present perception, I find it natural to suppose that perceptions that could be put
into the classification of being alert human perceptions have such enormous struc-
ture that they could easily distinguish between all of the 1011 or so persons that
are typically assigned to our history of the human race. In other words, in practice,
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different people can presumably be distinguished by their conscious feelings.
Another classification of perceptions might be given by classifying the percep-
tions operators E(p) rather than the content of the perceptions themselves. This
would be more analogous to classifying people by the quantum nature of their bod-
ies (in particular, presumably by the characteristics of their brains). However, I
doubt that in a fundamental sense there is any absolute classification that uniquely
distinguishes each person in all circumstances. (Of course, one could presumably
raise this criticism about the classification of any physical object, such as a “chair”
or even a “proton”: precisely what projection operators correspond to the existence
of a “chair” or of a “proton”?) Therefore, in the present framework perceptions are
fundamental, but persons (or individual minds), like other physical objects, are not,
although they certainly do seem to be very good approximate entities (perhaps as
good as chairs or even protons) that I do not wish to deny. Even if there is no ab-
solute definition of persons in the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics itself,
the concept of persons and minds does occur in some sense as part of the content
of my present perception, just the concepts of chairs and of protons do (in what are
perhaps slightly different “present perceptions,” since I am not quite sure that I can
be consciously aware of all three concepts at once, though I seem to be aware that
I have been thinking of three concepts).
In this way the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics proposed here is a
particular manifestation of Hume’s ideas [41], that “what we call a mind, is nothing
but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations,
and suppos’d, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity” (p.
207), and that the self is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions”
(p. 252). As he explains in the Appendix (p. 634), “When I turn my reflexion on
myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I
ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. ’Tis the composition of these, therefore,
which forms the self.” (Here I should note that what Hume calls a perception may
be only one component of the “phenomenal perspective” or “maximal experience”
[25] that I have been calling a perception p, so one p can include “one or more
perceptions” ci(p) in Hume’s sense.)
Furthermore, each experience or perception operator E(p) need not have any
precise location in either space or time associated with it, so there need be no fun-
damental place or time connected with each perception. Indeed, Sensible Quantum
Mechanics can easily survive a replacement of spacetime with some other structure
(e.g., superstrings) as more basic in the quantum world. Of course, the contents of
a perception can include a sense or impression of the time of the perception, just
as my present perception when I perceive that I am writing this includes a feeling
that it is now A.D. 1995, so the set of perceptions p must include perceptions with
such beliefs, but there need not be any precise time in the physical world associated
with a perception. That is, perceptions are ‘outside’ physical spacetime (even if
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spacetime is a fundamental element of the physical world, which I doubt).
As a consequence of these considerations, there are no unique time-sequences of
perceptions to form an individual mind or self in Sensible Quantum Mechanics. In
this way the present framework appears to differ from those proposed by Squires
[42], Albert and Loewer [43, 23], and Stapp [32]. (Stapp’s also differs in having
the wavefunction collapse at each “Heisenberg actual event,” whereas the other
two agree with mine in having a fixed quantum state, in the Heisenberg picture,
which never collapses.) Lockwood’s proposal [25] seems to be more similar to mine,
though he also proposes (p. 232) “a continuous infinity of parallel such streams”
of consciousness, “differentiating over time,” whereas Sensible Quantum Mechanics
has no such stream as fundamental. On the other hand, later Lockwood [44] does
explicitly repudiate the Albert-Loewer many-minds interpretation, so there seems
to me to be little disagreement between Lockwood’s view and Sensible Quantum
Mechanics except for the detailed formalism and manner of presentation. Thus
one might label Sensible Quantum Mechanics as the Hume-Everett-Lockwood-Page
(HELP) interpretation, though I do not wish to imply that these other three scholars,
on whose work my proposal is heavily based, would necessarily agree with my present
formulation.
Of course, the perceptions themselves can include components that seem to be
memories of past perceptions or events. In this way it can be a very good ap-
proximation to give an approximate order for perceptions whose content include
memories that are correlated with the contents of other perceptions. It might in-
deed be that the measure density m(p) for perceptions including detailed memories
is rather heavily peaked around approximate sequences constructed in this way. But
I would doubt that the contents of the perceptions p, the perception operators E(p),
or the measure densities m(p) for the set of perceptions would give unique sequences
of perceptions that one could rigorously identify with individual minds.
Because the physical state of our universe seems to obey the second law of
thermodynamics, with growing correlations in some sense, I suspect that the measure
density m(p) may have rather a smeared peak (or better, ridge) along approximately
tree-like structures of branching sequences of perceptions, with perceptions further
out along the branches having contents that includes memories that are correlated
with the present-sensation components of perceptions further back toward the trunks
of the trees. This is different from what one might expect from a classical model
with a discrete number of conscious beings, each of which might be expected to
have a unique sharp sequence or non-branching trajectory of perceptions. In the
quantum case, I would expect that what are crudely viewed as quantum choices
would cause smeared-out trajectories to branch into larger numbers of smeared-out
trajectories with the progression of what we call time. If each smeared-out trajectory
is viewed as a different individual mind, we do get roughly a “many-minds” picture
that is analogous to the “many-worlds” interpretation [6, 7], but in my framework of
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Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the “many minds” are only approximate and are not
fundamental as they are in the proposal of Albert and Loewer [43]. Instead, Sensible
Quantum Mechanics is a “many-perceptions” or “many-sensations” interpretation.
One might thus label it philosophically as Mindless Sensationalism.
Even in a classical model, if there is one perception for each conscious being
at each moment of time in which the being is conscious, the fact that there may
be many conscious beings, and many conscious moments, can be said to lead to
a “many-perceptions” interpretation. However, in Sensible Quantum Mechanics,
there may be vastly more perceptions, since they are not limited to a discrete set
of one-parameter sharp sequences of perceptions, but occur for all perceptions p for
which m(p) is positive. In this way a quantum model may be said to be even “more
sensible” (or is it “more sensational”?) than a classical model. One might distinguish
SQM from a classical model like SCM with many perceptions by calling SQM a
“very-many-perceptions” framework, meaning that almost all (say as defined by the
prior measure) possible perceptions actually occur with nonzero measure density.
(Thus SQM might, in a narrowly literal sense, almost be a version of panpsychism,
but the enormous range possible for the logarithm of the measure density means
that it is really quite far from the usual connotations ascribed to panpsychism. This
is perhaps comparable to noting that there may be a nonzero amplitude that almost
any system, such as a star, has a PC in it, and then calling the resulting many-worlds
theory pancomputerism.)
One might fear that the present attack on the assumption of any definite notion
of a precise identity for persons or minds as sequences of perceptions would threaten
human dignity. Although I would not deny that I feel that it might, I can point
out that on the other hand, the acceptance of the viewpoint of Sensible Quantum
Mechanics might increase one’s sense of identity with all other humans and other
conscious beings. Furthermore, it might tend to undercut the motivations toward
selfishness that I perceive in myself if I could realize in a deeply psychological way
that what I normally anticipate as my own future perceptions are in no fundamental
way picked out from the set of all perceptions. (Of course, what I normally think
of as my own future perceptions are presumably those that contain memory com-
ponents that are correlated with the content of my present perception, but I do not
see logically why I should be much more concerned about trying to make such per-
ceptions happy than about trying to make perceptions happy that do not have such
memories: better to do unto others as I would wish they would do unto me.) One
can find that Parfit [45] had earlier drawn similar, but much more sophisticated,
conclusions from a view in which a unique personal identity is not fundamental.
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8 Quantum Field Theory Model
Although Sensible Quantum Mechanics transcends quantum theories in which
space and time are fundamental, and although I believe that such theories will need
to be transcended to give a good theory of our universe, it might help to get a
better feel for the spacetime properties of perceptions by considering the context
of quantum field theory in an unquantized curved globally-hyperbolic background
spacetime in which spacetime points are unambiguously distinguished by the space-
time geometry (so that the Poincare´ symmetries are entirely broken and one need
not worry about integrating over gP (p)g−1’s to satisfy superselection rules for en-
ergy, momentum, and/or angular momentum [46]). This simplified model might in
some sense be a good approximation for part of the entire quantum state of the uni-
verse in a correct theory if there is one that does fit into the framework of Sensible
Quantum Mechanics and does give a suitable classical spacetime approximation.
In the Heisenberg picture used in this paper, the quantum state is independent of
time (i.e., of a choice of Cauchy hypersurface in the spacetime), but the Heisenberg
equations of evolution for the fundamental fields and their conjugate momenta can
be used to express the operators E(p) in terms of the fields and momenta on any
Cauchy hypersurface. The arbitrariness of the hypersurface means that even in
this quantum field theory with a well-defined classical spacetime, and even with a
definite foliation of the spacetime by a one-parameter (time) sequence of Cauchy
hypersurfaces, there is no unique physical time that one can assign to any of the
perceptions p; they are ‘outside’ time as well as space.
Furthermore, the operatorsE(p) in this simplified model are all likely to be highly
nonlocal in terms of local field operators on any Cauchy hypersurface, since quantum
field theories that we presently know do not seem to have enough local operators
to describe the complexities of an individual perception, unless one considers high
spatial derivatives of the field and conjugate momentum operators. However, for
a given one-parameter (time) sequence of Cauchy hypersurfaces, one might rather
arbitrarily choose to define a preferred time for each perception p as the time giving
the Cauchy hypersurface on which the corresponding E(p), if expressed in terms
of fields and momenta on that hypersurface, has in some sense the smallest spatial
spread at that time.
For example, to give a tediously explicit ad hoc prescription, on a Cauchy hyper-
surface labeled by the time t one might choose a point P and a ball that is the set
of all points within a certain geodesic radius r of the point. Then one can define an
operator E ′(p; t, P, r) that is obtained from E(p) written in terms of the fields and
conjugate momenta at points on the hypersurface by throwing away all contribu-
tions that have any fields or conjugate momenta at points outside the ball of radius
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r from the point P . Now define the overlap fraction
F (p; t, P, r) =
〈E(p)E ′(p; t, P, r)〉〈E ′(p; t, P, r)E(p)〉
〈E(p)E(p)〉〈E ′(p; t, P, r)E ′(p; t, P, r)〉 . (20)
(If both E(p) and E ′(p; t, P, r) were projection operators, and the actual quantum
state were a pure state, then F would be the overlap probability between the states
obtained by projecting the actual quantum state by these projectors and normaliz-
ing.) If E(p) is nonlocal, this fraction F will be small if the radius r is small but
will be nearly unity if the radius r is large enough for the ball to encompass almost
all of the Cauchy hypersurface. For each perception p, time t, and point P , one
can find the smallest r that gives F = 1/2, say, and call that value of the radius
r(p; t, P ). Then one can find the point P = P (p; t) on the hypersurface that gives
the smallest r(p; t, P ) on that hypersurface for the fixed perception p and call the
resulting radius r(p; t). Finally, define the preferred time tp as the time t for which
r(p; t) is the smallest, and label that smallest value of r(p; t) for the fixed perception
p as rp.
If the perception operator E(p) for some human conscious perception is not
unduly nonlocal in the simplified model under present consideration, and if the
quantum state of the fields in the spacetime has macroscopic structures that at the
time tp of the perception are fairly well localized (e.g., with quantum uncertainties
less than a millimeter, say, which would certainly not be a generic state, even among
states which give a significant m(p) for the perception in question), one might expect
that at this time the ball within radius rp of the point P (p; tp) on the hypersurface
labeled by tp would be inside a human brain. It would be interesting if one could
learn where the point P (p; tp) is in a human brain, and what the radius rp is, for
various human perceptions, and how the location and size of this ball depends on
the perception p.
9 Testing and Comparing Sensible Quantum Me-
chanics Theories
Any proposed theory should be tested against experience before being accepted.
If one has a theory in which only a small subset of the set of all possible perceptions
is predicted to occur (e.g., a classical theory in which there are a finite number, one
for each conscious being, of time-sequences of perceptions that are determined by
the trajectory in the phase space of the system), one can simply check whether an
experienced perception is in that subset. If it is not, that is clear evidence against
the theory.
The situation is unfortunately more complicated in very-many-perceptions the-
ories, such as Sensible Quantum Mechanics, in which almost all perceptions are
predicted to occur with nonzero measure density m(p). Unless one experienced a
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perception in the set, say S0, for which the particular SQM theory under investiga-
tion predicts m(p) = 0, one could not absolutely rule out that theory. For a typical
SQM theory, the set S0 is of measure zero, either using the prior measure, or even
using the measure of an alternative typical SQM theory, such as, presumably, the
(unknown) correct theory. I.e., it is likely that µ′(S0) = 0 from the measure µ
′(S)
for almost any other theory, such as the unknown correct one. Thus one is not at all
likely to have a perception that would absolutely rule out almost any specific SQM
theory.
The best one can hope for with a very-many-perceptions theory is to find like-
lihood evidence for or against it, where the likelihood is the probability that the
theory assigns or predicts for an experienced outcome. Even this cannot be done
directly for a particular experienced perception p in SQM theories, since they merely
assign a measure density m(p) to the perception and not a probability to it. One
somehow needs to get an assigned probability for the perception or some aspect of
it from the theory.
In the case of SQMD with a countably discrete set of perceptions, and in the
case in which the total measure µ(M) of the set M of all perceptions is finite,
one could assign the normalized probability Pr(p) = m(p)/µ(M) to each individual
perception p. However, even in this highly restricted case, a very low Pr(p) assigned
to the experienced perception would not necessarily be strong evidence against the
particular SQMD theory that made this assignment, for it might simply be that
there are a huge number of possible perceptions in the theory, each of which is
assigned a similarly low Pr(p).
If there were only a finite total number N of possible perceptions in some SQMD
theory, one could say that a typical perception p should have Pr(p) not too much
lower than Pr0(p) ≡ µ0(p)/µ0(M) = 1/N , the probability that one gets from the
prior measure that weights each discrete perception equally. Thus an experience of
a perception p for which the theory predicts NPr(p)≪ 1 would be evidence against
that theory.
However, the apparent complexity of my present perception suggests to me that
if one restricted attention to theories having only a finite number N of possible
perceptions, the simplest of these theories giving my perception among the N would
have N very large. (One could logically have a theory in which only my present
perception existed, an utterly extreme form of solipsism, but I strongly doubt that
such a theory could be so simple as a theory with many possible perceptions. This
is analogous to saying that although logically there exists a theory which gives the
single positive integer
8568193572865287529475652899568765824569287623819923752927591010,
this theory is not so simple in some sense as the simplest theory which gives all the
first 999 positive integers.) Furthermore, if the simplest such theory with a finite
set of possible perceptions, including mine, gave N very large, I would suspect that
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an even simpler theory existed which includes my perception and in which the total
number of possible perceptions is not restricted to be finite. (This is analogous to
saying that the infinite set of all positive integers is simpler than the large but finite
set of the first 999 integers.)
Because of such examples showing how an infinite set can easily be simpler than
a finite set, I suspect that the total number of possible perceptions is infinite. (An
extension of this reasoning further suggests to me that it may be simpler to have
the set of possible perceptions continuous rather than discrete, though in this case
it is less compelling. If one continued accepting a sequence of such arguments, one
would apparently be led to a set with infinite cardinality, which seems as if it might
in the end be more complex, but that might just be the appearance to our limited
way of thinking.)
In any case, it would be nice to have a way of calculating the likelihood for one’s
perception in SQM theories more general than those with a finite number of possible
perceptions. To do this, it seems that one needs to go beyond the probability for the
mere existence of the perception (which in the existential sense is unity in SQM for
all perceptions with positive measure density, and which in the frequency sense is
useful only if µ(p)/µ(M) is nonzero, which requires that the perceptions be discrete
so that the measure µ(p) for a single perception be positive, and furthermore requires
that the total measure µ(M) for the set M of all perceptions be finite).
One probability assigned by a particular SQM theory to a perception that may
be calculated simply from the measure and the measure density is the probability
that a perception is as “typical” as it is, where the (ordinary) typicality T (p) of one’s
perception p may be defined in the following way if the total measure µ(M) for all
perceptions is finite: Let S≤(p) be the set of perceptions p
′ with m(p′) ≤ m(p).
Then
T (p) ≡ µ(S≤(p))/µ(M). (21)
For p fixed and p˜ chosen randomly with the infinitesimal measure dµ(p˜), the prob-
ability that T (p˜) is less than or equal to T (p) is
PT (p) ≡ P (T (p˜) ≤ T (p)) = T (p). (22)
In the case in which m(p) varies continuously in such a way that T (p) also varies
continuously, this typicality T (p) has a uniform probability distribution between 0
and 1, but if there is a nonzero measure of perceptions with the same value of m(p),
then T (p) has discrete jumps. (In the extreme case in which m(p) is one constant
value over all perceptions, T (p) is unity for each p.)
Using this particular criterion of typicality and assuming that one’s perception
p is indeed typical in this regard, one might say that agreement with observation
requires that the prediction, by the theory in question, of PT (p) = T (p) for one’s
observation p be not too much smaller than unity.
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Once one defines a typicality, such as by Eq. (21), one can use a Bayesian ap-
proach and assign prior probabilities P (Hi) to individual hypotheses Hi. Suppose
that each such hypothesis gives a particular SQM theory in detail, and hence its
predictions for a measure density mi(p) over all perceptions, from which one can
assign a particular typicality Ti(p) to the perception one experiences. Then the
probability PTi(p) that the theory predicts that a random perception would have a
typicality no greater than Ti(p), which by Eq. (22) is Ti(p) itself, may be taken to
be the likelihood of Hi given p. By Bayes’ rule, the posterior conditional probability
that one should then rationally assign to the hypothesis Hi, if one followed this
prescription of interpreting the typicality as the conditional probability (given the
hypothesis Hi) for one’s particular perception p, would be
P (Hi|p) = P (Hi)Ti(p)∑
j P (Hj)Tj(p)
. (23)
The main new difficulty in this Bayesian approach, even if it is assumed that one
can indeed calculate the typicality for the perception given each hypothesis Hi, is the
assignment of the prior probabilities P (Hi). These probabilities are certainly not the
frequency-type probabilities that occur within one SQM theory, nor are they even
“probabilities” assigned to the unconscious quantum world in what I am claiming
are some sort of mythical idealization or approximation for what I am proposing are
the true frequency-type probabilities for the conscious world. Instead, these prior
probabilities would be purely subjective probabilities (in a way that I am claiming
that the ratios of measures in the conscious world are not; the latter are supposed to
be entirely objective frequency-type probabilities, though their precise values would
be inaccessible to us unless we were given the correct precise SQM theory for our
universe). The prior probabilities are more like propensities in that they might be
interpreted as our guesses for the propensities for God to have created a universe
according to the particular SQM theories in question. (It is conceivable that they
could be interpreted as frequencies for an ensemble of universes described by the
various different SQM theories, but this would require a meta-theory for such an
ensemble, which definitely goes beyond the ensemble of worlds in the Everett many-
worlds interpretation of one single closed quantum system such as the universe, or the
ensemble of conscious perceptions within one single SQM theory and corresponding
physical world.)
Since the prior probabilities assigned to particular SQM hypotheses Hi are sub-
jective, they may be assigned rather arbitrarily. Based upon the goal of getting a
simple complete theory for the universe, one might prefer to choose them so that
simpler theories would be given higher prior probabilities. For example, one simple
choice for a countably infinite set of hypotheses is the set of prior probabilities
P (Hi) = 2
−ni, (24)
where ni is the rank of Hi in order of increasing complexity.
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Unfortunately, even to make this simple assignment, one would need to assume
some particular background knowledge with respect to which one might define “com-
plexity.” In the cases in which one simply wants to compare the complexity of very
complex items, the background knowledge, if sufficiently small compared with the
information in the items, is not too important. But for the goal of finding a complete
theory of the universe which may not have a large amount of information in it, the
background knowledge is relatively important and seems to thwart an attempt to
use the simple formula Eq. (24). However, since Eq. (24) is a subjective (if appar-
ently simple) choice anyway, one could simply use it with a subjective choice of the
background knowledge with respect to which the rank of Hi in order of increasing
complexity is made. The only difficulty is that if a different choice were made, then
even for the same perception p, the same set of hypotheses Hi, and the same cal-
culations of the typicalities Ti(p), Eq. (23) would give a different assignment of the
posterior probabilities for the hypotheses. It is then an open question whether the
theory that is thus assigned the highest posterior probability would then the same in
both cases, though that could be true if the typicalities assigned by the various the-
ories varied so much that the posterior probabilities (23) are then relatively stable
with respect to the changes in the prior probabilities (24). (This is indeed roughly
what seems to occur for many well-established theories within present physics, such
as Maxwell’s electromagnetism, which most physicists accept within a certain do-
main of applicability, since they would assign very low prior probabilities to more
complicated alternatives that fit the data, even if they did not agree precisely how
low to set such prior probabilities.)
There is also the potential technical problem that one might assign nonzero prior
probabilities to hypotheses Hi in which the total measure µ(M) for all perceptions
is not finite, so that the right side of Eq. (21) may have both numerator and denomi-
nator infinite, which makes the typicality Ti(p) inherently ambiguous. To avoid this
problem, one might use, instead of Ti(p) in Eq. (23), rather
Ti(p;S) = µi(S≤(p) ∩ S)/µi(S) (25)
for some set of perceptions S containing p that has µi(S) finite for each hypothesis
Hi. This is related to a practical limitation anyway, since one could presumably only
hope to be able to compare the measure densities m(p) for some small set of per-
ceptions rather similar to one’s own, though it is not clear in quantum cosmological
theories that allow an infinite amount of inflation how to get a finite measure even
for a small set of perceptions. Unfortunately, even if one can get a finite measure
by suitably restricting the set S, this makes the resulting P (Hi|p;S) depend on this
chosen S as well as on the other postulated quantities such as P (Hi).
Instead of using the particular typicality defined by Eq. (21) above, one could
of course instead use any other property of perceptions which places them into
an ordered set to define a corresponding “typicality.” For example, I might be
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tempted to order them according to their complexity, if that could be well defined.
Thinking about this alternative “typicality” leaves me surprised that my own present
perception seems to be highly complicated but apparently not infinitely so. What
simple complete theory could make a typical perception have a high but not infinite
complexity?
However, the “typicality” defined by Eq. (21) has the merit of being defined
purely from the prior and fundamental measures, with no added concepts such
as complexity that would need to be defined. The necessity of being able to rank
perceptions, say by their measure density, in order to calculate a typicality, is indeed
one of my main motivations for postulating a prior measure Eq. (4).
Nevertheless, there are alternative typicalities that one can define purely from
the prior and fundamental measures. For example, one might define a reversed
typicality Tr(p) in the following way (again assuming that the total measure µ(M) for
all perceptions is finite): Let S≥(p) be the set of perceptions p
′ with m(p′) ≥ m(p).
Then
Tr(p) ≡ µ(S≥(p))/µ(M). (26)
For p fixed and p˜ chosen randomly with the infinitesimal measure dµ(p˜), the prob-
ability that Tr(p˜) is less than Tr(p) is
PTr(p) ≡ P (Tr(p˜) ≤ Tr(p)) = Tr(p), (27)
the analogue of Eq. (22) for the ordinary typicality.
In the generic continuum case in which m(p) varies continuously in such a way
that there is only an infinitesimally small measure of perceptions whose m(p) are
infinitesimally near any fixed value, the reversed typicality Tr(p) is simply one minus
the ordinary typicality, i.e., 1−T (p), and also has a uniform probability distribution
between 0 and 1. Its use arises from the fact that just as a perception with very
low ordinary typicality T (p)≪ 1 could be considered unusual, so a perception with
an ordinary typicality too near one (and hence a reversed typicality too near zero,
Tr(p)≪ 1) could also be considered unusual, “too good to be true.”
Perhaps one might like to combine the ordinary typicality with the reversed
typicality to say that a perception giving either typicality too near zero would be
evidence against the theory. For example, one might define the dual typicality Td(p)
as the probability that a random perception p˜ has the lesser of its ordinary and its
reversed typicalities less than or equal to that of the perception under consideration:
Td(p) ≡ P (min [T (p˜), Tr(p˜)] ≤ min [T (p), Tr(p)]) ≡ µ(Sd(p))/µ(M), (28)
where Sd(p) is the set of all perceptions p˜ with the minimum of its ordinary and
reversed typicalities less than or equal to that of the perception p, i.e., the set with
min [T (p˜), Tr(p˜)] ≤ min [T (p), Tr(p)]. In the case in which T (p), and hence also
Tr(p), varies continuously from 0 to 1,
Td(p) = 1− |1− 2T (p)|. (29)
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Then the dual typicality Td(p) would be very small if the ordinary typicality T (p)
were very near either 0 or 1.
Of course, one could go on with an indefinitely long sequence of typicalities, say
making a perception “atypical” if T (p) were very near any number of particular
values at or between the endpoint values 0 and 1. But these endpoint values are
the only ones that seem especially relevant, and so it would seem rather ad hoc to
define “typicalities” based on any other values. Since Td(p) is symmetrically defined
in terms of both endpoints (or, more precisely, in terms of both the ≤ and the
≥ relations for m(p′) in comparison with m(p)), in some sense it seems the most
natural one to use. Obviously, one could use it, or its modification along the lines
of Eq. (25), instead of T (p) in the Bayesian Eq. (23).
To illustrate how one might use these typicalities in a Bayesian analysis, consider
the SQMn alteration of SQM given by Eq. (13) with f [m(p)] = m(p)n. Suppose
that the exponent n is postulated to be uncertain (unlike in pure SQM, where it is
postulated to be precisely 1), say with a prior probability distribution P (n)dn simply
equal to dn and hence uniform over all n. This prior distribution is obviously not
normalizable, but the normalization or lack thereof will cancel out in Eq. (23) in the
use I am giving it.
Now consider a simple toy model in which the perceptions p form a continuum
of one dimension (labeled by a single real number, which for simplicity I shall also
call p), with the uniform prior measure dµ0(p) = dp, and with m(p), the expectation
value of E(p), having a gaussian distribution in p, say m(p) = e−p
2/2 with the origin
and scale of the numbers p adjusted so that the mean of the distribution is at p = 0
and the standard deviation is 1. Now suppose that a perception of a particular value
p occurs.
Since f [m(p)] = m(p)n = e−np
2/2 is also a gaussian in p centered at zero, but with
standard deviation 1/
√
n, one can readily calculate that for positive n the typicality
of the perception p in the theory labeled by the exponent n is
T (p) = erfc(
√
np2/2) ≡ 1− erf(
√
np2/2) ≡ 1− 2√
pi
∫ √np2/2
0
e−x
2
dx, (30)
the reversed typicality is
Tr(p) = 1− T (p) = erf(
√
np2/2), (31)
and the dual typicality is
Td(p) = 1− |1− 2T (p)| = 1− |1− 2Tr(p)|
= 1− |1− 2erfc(
√
np2/2)| = 1− |1− 2erf(
√
np2/2)|. (32)
For negative n the measure density f [m(p)] = m(p)n diverges for large p, so the
typicality and dual typicalities are both zero in that case, whereas the reversed
typicality is unity.
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Now we can insert these typicalities and the ad hoc prior measure P (n)dn = dn
into the Bayesian Eq. (23) to calculate the posterior probability distribution for the
exponent n given a particular perception p. Using the ordinary typicality T (p),
the sum in the denominator of Eq. (23) becomes an integral over n, which can be
restricted to positive n, since T (p) vanishes for negative n, and which gives the value
1/p2. Thus the corresponding posterior probability distribution becomes
P (n|p)dn = p2erfc(
√
p2n/2)dn (33)
for positive n, and 0 for negative n.
This probability density P (n|p) is monotonically decreasing with n, with the
mth moment of n being
〈nm〉 = (2m+ 1)!!
(m+ 1)p2m
. (34)
(Here and in the remainder of this Section the angular brackets 〈〉 denote the ex-
pectation value in the probability distribution for n given p, not the quantum ex-
pectation value in the state σ that the angular brackets denote in other parts of this
paper.) Thus the mean posterior value for n is 3/(2p2) = 1.5/p2, and its standard
deviation is
√
11/(2p2) ≈ 1.658312/p2. (The mean and standard deviation are both
larger than 1 even if p = 1, essentially because we started with the uniform prior
distribution P (n)dn = dn which has an infinite mean and standard deviation, at
least if it is restricted to n ≥ 0 where the typicality of a finite p is not 0. One would
get a mean closer to unity if one had instead started with a prior distribution such
as P (n)dn = [pi(1 + n2)]−1dn, which is invariant under n → 1/n, but I shall not
further consider here such a more complicated prior distribution.)
For n ≫ 1/p2 the probability distribution of Eq. (33) has an exponentially de-
creasing asymptotic form
P (n|p)dn ∼
√
2
pip2n
e−
1
2
p2n. (35)
Thus a perception of, say, p ∼ 1, which is roughly what one would expect if the
exponent n were indeed 1 as SQM would give, would by Eq. (23), with the ordinary
typicality used there as the likelihood of the perception p given the hypothesis of a
particular value of n, lead one to a very small posterior probability that n≫ 1 even
if one started with the unnormalized uniform prior distribution P (n)dn = dn that
is almost entirely weighted at arbitrarily large values of n.
If we average the posterior probability distribution Eq. (33) over the gaussian
distribution e−p
2/2 that would be given for p if indeed SQM and its value of n = 1
were correct, then one would get the following averaged posterior distribution for n:
P¯ (n)dn = 2(arctan
1√
n
−
√
n
n+ 1
)dn. (36)
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This distribution is normalized, unlike the prior distribution for n that was adopted,
but since for large n, P¯ (n) ∼ (4/3)n−3/2, the mean and higher moments for n are
infinite. Therefore, if all equal ranges for n are a priori assumed to be equally
likely, then the average of all observations of p, if n = 1 were really unknowingly
correct, would damp the posterior probability distribution for n at large n so that
it would become normalizable, but it would be damped so weakly that the mean
would still be undefined. Nevertheless, any single observation of a p 6= 0 would
give a posterior distribution Eq. (33) exponentially damped for sufficiently large n,
and hence with a finite mean and rms value, even though these finite values from
individual observations would average out to divergent values when averaged over
the distribution of p that would result if indeed n = 1 (or indeed if n were any other
precise positive value). In any case, with or without the averaging over the values
of p, the posterior probability would be very small that n would have a value that
is sufficiently large, giving evidence against such large values of n.
On the other hand, the posterior probability distribution P (n|p)dn of Eq. (33)
does not provide significant evidence against a value of n much smaller than 1/p2,
since it is even relatively larger at very small values of n than was the uniform
P (n)dn from which it was derived. This illustrates the limitations of using merely
the ordinary typicality to deduce posterior probabilities, since it provides no penalty
for results “too good to be true,” namely ordinary typicalities very near unity. In
this example, if n were very small, a p near one would be much closer to its mean of
zero than the standard deviation 1/
√
n for p in the distribution f [m(p)] = m(p)n =
e−np
2/2. Intuitively, we ought be be surprised if we get a result much closer to the
peak of a gaussian probability distribution than one standard deviation, but using
only the ordinary typicality does not capture this intuition, since it says we should
only be surprised if we get a result too many standard deviations from the mean.
Using purely the reversed typicality Tr(p) instead would not be any good here,
since it would not give any penalty for getting a result with very low ordinary
typicality. In fact, the denominator of Eq. (23) would then simply diverge from the
integration over negative n, which would give a reversed typicality of unity. If one
put a cutoff at large negative n, did the calculation, and then let the cutoff tend to
negative infinity, one would find that the resulting Pr(n|p) would have almost all its
contribution from arbitrarily negative n.
The best of the three typicalities to use in Eq. (23) would thus appear to be the
dual typicality Td(p). Inserting this and the uniform prior distribution for n into
Eq. (23) gives
Pd(n|p)dn = Np2 min [erfc(
√
p2n/2), erf(
√
p2n/2)]dn, (37)
where
N−1 = 1− 2x21 + 8
∫ x1
0
dx x erfc(x) ≈ 0.857348 ≈ (1.166387)−1. (38)
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with x1 ≈ 0.476936 being the positive value of x for which erf(x) = erfc(x) = 1/2.
This posterior probability distribution Pd(n|p)dn is not only damped at large p2n,
which would give p a low ordinary typicality, but also at small p2n, which would
give p a low reversed typicality (i.e., an ordinary typicality unusually near one).
Pd(n|p)dn gives a mean value for n of about 1.727468/p2, and a standard deviation of
about 1.686141/p2, which are both even higher than those for P (n|p)dn, essentially
because Pd(n|p)dn damps the contribution at small n and gives a higher weight to
the contribution for larger n.
Thus we may note that the damping at small p2n is so weak, going only as the
square root of n, that a perception p, even if it is reasonably close to one standard
deviation from the mean, does not put very tight limits on n in SQMn with a uniform
prior distribution for n. In this way it seems, at least for a gaussian distribution
of expectation values for experience or perception operators E(p) (or for a discrete
distribution that is approximately gaussian, such as a binomial distribution for a
large number of possibilities), that if one allows the measures for the perceptions to
be an arbitrary power n of the expectation values with a broad prior distribution
for n, then no observation (i.e., perception) can give very tight limits on n. Thus it
may be that there is actually very little evidence (except for the simplicity that leads
me to propose n = 1 in Sensible Quantum Mechanics itself) that probabilities in
quantum mechanics (which I have argued apply only to conscious perceptions) are
proportional to the squares of the absolute values of appropriate amplitudes (i.e.,
to the first power of the expectation values of positive perception operators). It
would be interesting to see whether there are any highly nongaussian distributions
for perceptions that would be suitable for putting stringent limits on the power n
of the expectation value that enters in SQMn theories.
One idea for testing the exponent n more stringently in SQMn theories is the
following: Consider a set of perceptions that may be divided up into a large number
N of subsets, and for which one has some control on the relative expectation values
of the experience operators E(p). For example, consider the set S of perceptions that
include a conscious awareness of all the digits of a nonnegative decimal integer with
no more than k digits. (It seems hard for me, by looking at numbers on a computer
terminal, to convince myself that I can be consciously aware, in a single simultaneous
perception, of the values of more than about k = 8 digits, and I am not sure I can
really be conscious of all those at once, but k = 8 is my rough subjective estimate
of the limit for me. Note that this is not the number of digits I can memorize, for
I need not have all the digits that I can remember ever simultaneously be in any
single conscious perception.)
This set of perceptions can now be divided up into the N = 10k subsets of
perceptions that each include a component of being consciously aware of the values
of the decimal digits of a particular nonnegative integer of k digits or less. Group
these N = 10k sets into three sets, the first (S1) containing the perceptions of a
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particular subset of N1 of the integers, the second (S2) containing the perceptions
of a second subset of N2 integers (not overlapping with the first), and the third (S3)
containing the the perceptions of the remaining N3 = N −N1 −N2 integers.
Now employ some quantum decision-making device (such as a nonalgorithmic
random number generator that invokes quantum measurements and is nondeter-
ministic in the usual sense, even if it is deterministic in my global view when one
considers its effects within the entire wavefunction, i.e., across all the Everett many
worlds in that crude way of describing things, but not within a single randomly
chosen Everett world, where it will appear random). Use this device to produce a
quantum expectation value for each of the integers to appear, by itself, on a com-
puter terminal or printout where it can be read, with the expectation value being
roughly independent of the particular integer within each of the three sets described
above, but depending on which set the integer is in.
There is then the process of reading the integer and transferring the information
to whatever part of the brain that produces the conscious experience that includes
the awareness of all the digits of the integer (somewhat more accurately, the part of
the brain that has the relevant structure for the experience operator E(p) for each
of the possible perceptions of the entire integer). If this process can be idealized as
making m(p) = 〈E(p)〉 ≡ σ[E(p)] proportional to the quantum expectation value
for the corresponding integer to appear on a terminal or printout (an expectation
value that, up to a constant of proportionality, can be controlled by the experi-
menter), then one can choose the relative values of the m(p)’s, say m1, m2, and m3
respectively, for each of the three sets of integers.
Now in ordinary Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the measure density for each
perception p is simply the corresponding m(p), but in the SQMn alteration of SQM
given by Eq. (13), the measure density is f [m(p)] = m(p)n, where the exponent n
may be different from the value of 1 that it is postulated to have in pure SQM.
Therefore, in SQMn, the conditional probability that a perception is in the set S2,
say, given that it is in the set S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3, is, under the idealizations above,
Pn(S2|S) ≡ µ(S2)
µ(S)
=
mn2N2
mn1N1 +m
n
2N2 +m
n
3N3
, (39)
which depends on n and the ratios of the m’s, though not on the overall normaliza-
tion of the m’s, which is arbitrary.
For example, let N1 = 1, N2 = 10
k/2, so that then (assuming 10k ≫ 1, as it is
for, say, k = 8) N3 = 10
k − 10k/2 − 1 ≈ 10k = N . Then if one selects the quantum
decision-making device so that, up to an arbitrary constant overall normalization
factor, the m’s are m1 = 1/N1 = 1, m2 = 1/N2 = 10
−k/2, and m3 = 1/N3 ≈ 10−k,
one gets
Pn(S2|S) ≈ 1
10(n−1)k/2 + 1 + 10−(n−1)k/2
. (40)
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One can now see from this that if one has ordinary SQM with n = 1, there is
roughly one chance in three that a perception in the set S will be in the particular
subset S2, so such a perception would not be atypical if it occurred. But if such
a perception occurred and one assumed that an SQMn theory applied with n sig-
nificantly different from 1, then the probability that a perception within S is also
within S2 is only roughly 10
−|n−1|k/2, e.g., only 10−4 if k = 8 and either n = 0 or
n = 2. Therefore, such a perception would be highly atypical within such a theory,
and one would then have strong statistical evidence for rejecting such a theory, un-
less one had assigned it a prior probability P (Hi) that were very much nearer unity
than the prior probability assigned to ordinary SQM with n = 1. In another way of
stating it, at the 99% confidence level (i.e., rejecting hypotheses that predict that
the conditional probability of the observed perception within S2 is less than 1%),
the value of the exponent n would obey |n− 1| <∼ 4/k.
It is somewhat discouraging that this bound, if it indeed can be found to be
true, is not very tight, say if k is roughly 8, but at least it is sufficient to rule out
at the 99% confidence level what might be seen as the simplest alternative to SQM
with n = 1, namely SQMn with n = 2. (The theory with n = 0 could probably be
ruled out by other considerations, such as not predicting that it is any more typical
to perceive getting a million heads than to get zero after throwing a fair coin two
million times, if one is not perceiving the order of the million heads, and if one can
avoid the Attention Effect that would no doubt amplify the measure for perceptions
of zero heads.)
It may also be somewhat discouraging to note that with the quantum expectation
values, the m’s, chosen as above, there is a two-thirds conditional probability even
within SQM that the perception will not be within the set S2. If so, this test would
tell one virtually nothing, since then the perception (or at least the fact that it is in
S but not in S2) would be typical for any SQMn theory. One might want to select
the quantum decision-making device to make m2 relatively larger than the choice
above, so that then if SQM is correct the perception within S will almost certainly
also be within S2, but then the conditional probability that it would be within S2
even if SQMn were true with a different value of n would also be higher, so the test
would be less sensitive in ruling out different values of n.
Of course, if one wanted instead to try to show that n is not equal to 1, one
might make m2 sufficiently large that a perception within S would almost certainly
also be within S2 if n = 1, and then if it were found that such a perception were
not within S2, this would be statistical evidence that n is not one. Given the high
prior probability that one might tend to assign to n = 1, it might take a perception
outside S2 with m2 very high in order to make much of a case for concluding that
actually n is not equal to unity.
It is important to note that, given the irreducibly first-person nature of conscious
experience, it would not be sufficient evidence for anyone to be told of the result
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of such an experiment to test the value of n, since in SQMn one’s consciousness of
being told of the result would have a measure that is proportional to the nth power
of the expectation value of the experience operator E(p) for the consciousness of
being told, not of the E(p) for the consciousness of the digits of the decimal integer.
Anyone who wished to experience the result of the experiment would need to be
directly conscious of the digits themselves (which could of course be printed in the
report of the experiment, so that each reader could in a sense do the consciousness
part of the experiment for himself or herself). It would also not even be sufficient for
an experimenter simply to remember having done the experiment and having, say,
gotten a result supporting n equal to or close to 1, if he or she were not in the same
perception consciously aware of the digits of the number itself, because what would
matter for that conscious memory would be the nth power of the expectation value
of the experience operator E(p) for the consciousness of the memory, not of the
E(p) for the consciousness of the digits of the decimal integer itself. This is another
aspect that makes it apparently very difficult to get much strong evidence about
the value of the exponent n in the generalization of Sensible Quantum Mechanics
to SQMn theories.
10 Toy Models for Sensible Quantum Mechanics
To illustrate some of the structures and hypotheses discussed above for SQM
itself, let us first consider a simple toy system for which the quantum world has a
Hilbert-space dimension of two, i.e., the spin states of a spin-half system with basis
states |1〉 = |σz = 1〉 = | ↑〉 and |2〉 = |σz = −1〉 = | ↓〉. A general positive operator
for this system has the matrix form
(
t+ z x+ iy
x− iy t− z
)
(41)
for
t ≥
√
x2 + y2 + z2. (42)
Hence any awareness operator A(S) for any set of perceptions must have this form for
this two-state quantum system. The set of parameters {t, x, y, z} with the inequal-
ity (42) forms a four-dimensional manifold with boundary, which one can readily
visualize in this example as the interior of the future light cone, and its bound-
ary, in a (fictitious) four-dimensional Minkowski spacetime. For the A(S) to be
a positive-operator-valued measure as the Quantum-Consciousness Connection as-
sumption demands, the parameters {t, x, y, z} must be linear functions of the sets
S, so that the parameters for the union of disjoint subsets are the sums of the
corresponding parameters for the subsets themselves.
First let us consider SQMC theories in which the set of perceptions is continuous.
If this set forms a manifold, one can assign a volume element dµ0(p) to it to give
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the prior measure (4), from which by Eq. (5) one can define an experience operator
E(p) for each perception p, also necessarily of the form (41) as each A(S) is.
If the dimensionality of the setM of perceptions in this model is larger than three,
and if the map from this set to the set of (necessarily positive) experience operators
E(p) is smooth, then necessarily two different perceptions must have experience
operators proportional to each other. Thus the Pairwise Independence Hypothesis
will not hold in this case.
In order to require that the Pairwise Independence Hypothesis hold, I shall
henceforth assume that the dimensionality of the set M of perceptions in this toy
model is no larger than three (i.e., one less than the square of the dimension of
the quantum Hilbert space being considered). First, consider the case in which the
dimensionality is exactly three, and for simplicity assume that perceptions in the
set are parametrized by the triplet {u, v, w} of real numbers obeying the inequality
r(u, v, w) ≡
√
u2 + v2 + w2 ≤ 1. (43)
Then one simple choice for the experience operators is
E(p) ≡ E(u, v, w) =
(
t(1 + w) t(u+ iv)
t(u− iv) t(1− w)
)
, (44)
where t = t(u, v, w) is some nonnegative weight function over the set of perceptions.
One can also write the prior measure volume element as
dµ0(p) = m0(u, v, w)dudvdw (45)
for some nonnegative weight function m0(u, v, w). Then Eq. (5) gives
A(S) =
∫
S
t(u, v, w)m0(u, v, w)dudvdw
(
1 + w u+ iv
u− iv 1− w
)
. (46)
One sees that the awareness operators do not depend separately upon the weight
functions t(u, v, w) and m0(u, v, w), but only upon their product. Of course, the
prior measure
µ0(S) ≡
∫
S
dµ0(p) =
∫
S
m0(u, v, w)dudvdw (47)
does depend upon m0(u, v, w) alone, so it is logically an independent degree of free-
dom. However, in this model, one could adopt one of the normalization hypotheses
for the experience operators to fix t(u, v, w). For example, the Constant-Maximum-
Normalization Hypothesis leads to t = 1/[1+r(u, v, w)]; the Unit-Normalization Hy-
pothesis, which is equivalent to the hypothesis (9) of SQMCT, leads to t(u, v, w) =
1/2; and the Projection-Normalization Hypothesis leads to t = 1/[1 + r(u, v, w)2] =
1/(1 + u2 + v2 + w2). Furthermore, one could use Eqs. (11) and (12) of SQMCR
to get m0(u, v, w) in terms of t(u, v, w) and its first derivatives (in a slightly com-
plicated formula not worth copying here for the general t(u, v, w)). For example,
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combining Eqs. (11) and (12) with the Projection-Normalization Hypothesis leads
to m0(u, v, w) =
√
8/(1+ u2 + v2 +w2)3, which is what I shall take for concreteness
in the following discussion of this example.
Now if one takes the quantum state to have the pure state ρ = |1〉〈1|, then
m(p) = 〈E(p)〉 = t(1 + w) = (1 + w)/(1 + u2 + v2 + w2). One can insert this into
Eq. (6) to get the measure for any set of perceptions, with the set S here being given
by some region of the three-dimensional space with coordinates (u, v, w):
µ(S) =
∫
S
m(u, v, w)m0(u, v, w)dudvdw =
∫
S
√
8(1 + w)
(1 + u2 + v2 + w2)4
dudvdw. (48)
One could then take appropriate ratios of such measures, such as in Eq. (3), as
giving conditional probabilities for various sets of perceptions. For example, one
could calculate the probability (22) that the typicality of a random perception in
this measure is less than that of a particular perception p labeled by (u, v, w). For a
generic perception in this present example, this calculation appears to be too messy
to be worth doing here, but the point is that, given the assumptions made above,
it can in principle be done (perhaps numerically if it is not possible to give explicit
elementary formulas for the result).
Another example within SQMC that one might consider is the case in which
the set M of perceptions forms a manifold of dimension one, say the circle S1
parametrized by the angle φ that runs from zero to 2pi and then repeats. (One
might regard this angle as denoting a cyclic time as perceived, but of course this
would depend on what is the precise content of the perception p parametrized by the
angle φ. The contents of the perceptions are features that are not captured merely by
the topology of the set M , the prior measure, and the experience operators.) In this
case one can adopt the Projection Hypothesis as well as the Pairwise Independence
Hypothesis, giving SQMP (or, to state more explicitly the assumption of the Pairwise
Independence Hypothesis, SQMIP). For example, the experience operators can take
the form Eq. (44) with t = 1/2, u = cos φ, v = sinφ, and w = 0, giving the
projection operators
E(p) ≡ E(φ) = P (φ) = 1
2
(
1 eiφ
e−iφ 1
)
. (49)
If we write the prior measure volume element as
dµ0(p) = m0(φ)dφ, (50)
for some nonnegative weight function m0(φ), then Eq. (5) gives
A(S) =
∫
S
m0(φ)dφ
1
2
(
1 eiφ
e−iφ 1
)
. (51)
In this case of a one-dimensional set of perceptions and the experience projection
operators of Eq. (49), the only natural choice for the prior measure density m0(φ)
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is a constant, which is what will be assumed here. For example, Eqs. (11) and (12)
of SQMCR give m0(φ) = 1/
√
2, but the value of the constant is not relevant to
testable conditional probabilities or typicalities.
If the quantum state is the pure state
ρ = (cos 1
2
θ|1〉+ sin 1
2
θ|2〉)(cos 1
2
θ〈1|+ sin 1
2
θ〈2|), giving the density matrix
ρ =
1
2
(
1 + cos θ sin θ
sin θ 1− cos θ
)
, (52)
then
m(p) = 〈E(p)〉 = Tr(E(p)ρ) = 1
2
(1 + sin θ cosφ). (53)
Assuming for simplicity that sin θ > 0, this leads to the following expressions for
the ordinary, reversed, and dual typicalities:
T (p) = 1− |φ+ sin θ sin φ|/pi, (54)
Tr(p) = |φ+ sin θ sinφ|/pi, (55)
T (p) = 1− |1− 2(|φ+ sin θ sinφ|/pi)|. (56)
For example, if it were hypothesized that θ = pi/2 = 90◦, and one observed φ =
5pi/6 = 150◦, then T (p) = (pi − 3)/(6pi) ≈ 0.007512, so by the criterion that the
typicality should not be too small, one could rule out this hypothesis for θ at the
99% confidence level.
Although we have been using the Heisenberg picture, in which the state is fixed,
it might be helpful to think of the present example in the Schro¨dinger picture in
which the experience operator E(p) is held fixed as a function of the “perceived
time” φ, and instead the state ρ changes with this “time.” In this example, one
can then think of the state as representing the direction of the spin of a spin-half
particle which precesses around the equatorial plane perpendicular to an axis at
an angle θ from the direction corresponding to the experience operator. When the
spin direction is closer to that of the experience operator, one gets a larger measure
density m(p) for the corresponding perception. This example illustrates how the
measure density need not be constant as a function of the “perceived time,” as
Sensible Quantum Mechanics has no requirement of any “unitarity” in the sense of
conservation with “time” of any probability or measure or measure density.
One could still maintain the Projection Hypothesis and yet extend the example
to one in which the perceptions form a two-dimensional space. For example, the
experience operators could take the form Eq. (44) with t = 1/2, u = sinϑ cosϕ,
v = sin ϑ sinϕ, and w = cosϑ, giving the projection operators
E(p) ≡ E(ϑ, ϕ) = P (ϑ, ϕ) = 1
2
(
1 + cosϑ sin ϑeiϕ
sinϑe−iϕ 1− cosϑ
)
. (57)
Here (ϑ, ϕ) are polar coordinates for a two-sphere. If one restricts ϑ not to include
the values of 0 and pi that it would take at the poles of the sphere, one could take
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ϕ to be a “perceived time,” as φ was in the previous example. Then one can take
ϑ to be an a second component of the perception, e.g., a “perceived temperature.”
One might even divide up the space of perceptions so that those with 0 < ϑ < pi/2
are defined to be those of a “cold” individual mind, and those with pi/2 < ϑ < pi
are defined to be those of a “hot” individual. (The “lukewarm” mind with ϑ = pi/2
forms a set of perceptions of measure zero and will be henceforth ignored.) However,
as mentioned above, this division of perceptions into individual “minds” is ad hoc
and not fundamental to Sensible Quantum Mechanics.
If one takes the rotationally-invariant prior measure volume element as
dµ0(p) = sin ϑdϑdϕ, (58)
which is proportional to what Eqs. (11) and (12) of SQMCR would give, then Eq. (5)
gives
A(S) =
∫
S
sin ϑdϑdϕ
1
2
(
1 + cosϑ sinϑeiϕ
sinϑe−iϕ 1− cosϑ
)
. (59)
Again taking the quantum state to be given by the (pure) density matrix of
Eq. (52), the measure density for each perception is
m(p) ≡ m(ϑ, ϕ) = 〈E(p)〉 = Tr(E(p)ρ)
=
1
2
(1 + cos θ cosϑ+ sin θ sin ϑ cosϕ) = cos2
1
2
ψ, (60)
where ψ is the angle between the spin direction corresponding to the state ρ, at polar
coordinates (θ, φ = 0), and that corresponding to the experience operator E(p), at
polar coordinates (ϑ, ϕ). Then the measure for any set S of perceptions, here being
given by some region of the two-sphere, is
µ(S) =
∫
S
m(p)dµ0(p) =
∫
S
m(ϑ, ϕ) sinϑdϑdϕ
=
∫
S
1
2
(1 + cos θ cos ϑ+ sin θ sin ϑ cosϕ) sinϑdϑdϕ. (61)
From this measure, one can readily calculate the various typicalities of each
perception as
T (p) = cos4
1
2
ψ, (62)
Tr(p) = 1− cos4 1
2
ψ, (63)
T (p) = 1− |1− 2 cos4 1
2
ψ|. (64)
One can also calculate various conditional probabilities, such as the conditional
probability distribution for the “perceived temperature” ϑ at a fixed range (perhaps
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infinitesimal) of the “perceived time” ϕ, or even the inverse conditional probability
distribution for the “time” at a fixed “temperature.” (One easily sees there need
be no preference for the perceived time component of a perception to be used as a
condition, rather than for any other component or aspect of a perception to be thus
used. That is, Sensible Quantum Mechanics not only does not need a preferred time
variable in the description of the quantum state and operators, but also it does not
need to single out a preferred temporal aspect of perceptions on which to base all
conditional probabilities.)
There are also other probabilities that one can calculate, such as the probability
that a perception belongs to a “cold” individual, which, using the ad hoc division
of the perceptions into those of “cold” and “hot” individuals above, comes out to
be (2 + cos θ)/4. In a similar way, in a complete Sensible Quantum Mechanics
theory, and with a precisely-defined ad hoc division of the possible perceptions into
those of, say, humans, dogs, insects, electronic computers, etc., one (with this one
admittedly being probably only a sufficiently intelligent being outside our universe)
should in principle be able to calculate the relative (frequency-type) probabilities
that a random perception fits into one of these categories. It would certainly be
interesting to know what these relative probabilities are (for some reasonable choice
of the classification). Since my own perception is human (or at least I presently
perceive it to be), and since I see no reason why it should not be typical, I personally
would suspect (even though one can readily see that this suspicion does not directly
follow merely from the assumption that the typicality of my perception is not small)
that the probability of a human perception would be greater than, or at least of
a comparable magnitude to, that of dogs, insects, or electronic computers, even
including those with perceptions that they are far to the future of what we perceive
the present epoch to be.
Next, let us consider SQMD theories in which the set of perceptions is discrete,
but still for the moment continue to use the simple toy system for which the quantum
world has a Hilbert-space dimension of two. If we adopt the Pairwise Independence
Hypothesis and the Projection Hypothesis, thus getting SMQIP theories, but do
not also adopt the Linear Independence Hypothesis to get the Linearly Independent
Projection Hypothesis and the resulting SQMLIP theories, then the experience op-
erators E(p) can be projection operators of the form given by Eq. (57) corresponding
to each of any discrete set of directions in three-space or points on a two-sphere (e.g.,
points each labeled by a pair of polar coordinates (ϑ, ϕ)). (One could also have one
of the experience operators being equal to the identity operator, the only rank-two
projection operator for the present toy system.) There can be an arbitrary large
number (even a countably infinite number, or even an uncountably infinite number)
of such pairwise independent discrete experience projection operators, so without
further hypotheses they are not limited by the dimension of the quantum Hilbert
space. As a result, there can be an arbitrarily large number of measure “densities”
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m(p) even in the discrete case.
If the set of these distinct experience projection operators is not fixed, then for
any pure quantum state such as the one given by the density matrix of Eq. (44), the
ratios of all the m(p)’s can be arbitrary. (If the state is not pure, then the ratios are
bounded by the ratio of the larger to the smaller eigenvalue of the density matrix.)
On the other hand, if the set of E(p)’s is fixed, and there is only the freedom of
what the state is (including how impure it may be), then since there are at most four
linearly independent positive operators (or projection operators) in the Hilbert space
of dimension two, there are at most four independent m(p)’s and three independent
ratios of them. In general, even if the quantum world is described by a Hilbert space
of finite dimension N , with N × N positive, hermitian density matrices as states,
and even if there is an arbitrarily large but discrete number of possible perceptions
p and corresponding experience operators E(p), the corresponding measures m(p)
for these perceptions can have arbitrary ratios for any pure state and hence do not
determine the state if the experience operators themselves are not known. On the
other hand, if the experience operators are known, then there are at most N2 linearly
independent m(p)’s (or N2−1 if the density matrix is assumed to be normalized), so
for a generic set of known E(p)’s, N2− 1 ratios of m(p)’s would uniquely determine
the state up to normalization.
Of course, in reality, any conscious being within the system has access to only
one perception and does not even have access to its measure (except that he may
typically assume that the measure is high enough that it is not too atypical), so he
can only use something like the Bayesian reasoning of Eq. (23) with some assign-
ment of prior probabilities (say based on simplicity) in order to make an effectively
probabilistic guess of the correct theory (e.g., of the correct experience operators
and the correct quantum state, if the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics is
assumed).
(Perhaps it would be more nearly true to say that if SQM is true, the correct
experience operators and the correct quantum state simply directly determine the
perceptions, and their measures, of beliefs in various theories, but in my perception
they seem to be determining that I come up with some sort of rational idealization of
how this choice might be made by an agent that is truly free to assign probabilities
to theories based on Bayesian reasoning. It is a deeper mystery how such a free
agent may be an idealized approximation to us when we choose theories if our
thought processes are not really free to choose to follow logical reasoning, say starting
with certain Bayesian assumptions, including a set of prior probabilities for various
hypotheses.)
Because there are only N2 − 1 independent ratios of m(p)’s for a fixed set of
experience operators in a Hilbert space dimension of dimension N , one might pre-
fer (though I myself do not see a strong reason for this preference) to restrict the
number of experience operators to be no greater than N2 and to require that they
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obey the Linear Independence Hypothesis, which, once the Projection Hypothesis is
also assumed, leads to SQMLIP theories obeying the Linearly Independent Projec-
tion Hypothesis. For the simple two-dimensional Hilbert-space model we have been
considering, one can have four rank-one projection operators of the form given by
Eq. (57), with the corresponding four directions in three-space not all being copla-
nar, or, equivalently, with the corresponding points on the two-sphere not all being
on the same great circle. If one has instead the identity operator and three rank-one
projection operators, then the corresponding three directions in three-space must
not be coplanar, or the corresponding points on the two-sphere must not all be on
the same great circle.
If one makes the Commuting Projection Hypothesis instead of the Linearly Inde-
pendent Projection Hypothesis, then for the two-dimensional Hilbert-space model
one can have at most three experience operators, the identity operator and two
orthogonal rank-one projection operators (i.e., two corresponding to two opposite
directions in three-space, or to antipodal points on the two-sphere). These three are
of course not linearly independent, since the two orthogonal rank-one projection op-
erators add up to the identity operators, so this particular SQMPC theory does not
obey the Linearly Independent Projection Hypothesis. If one added the latter, one
could have at most two experience operators, either the identity operator and one
(arbitrary) rank-one projection operator, or else two orthogonal rank-one projection
operators.
As a final example obeying the Projection Hypothesis, one may adopt the Or-
thogonal Projection Hypothesis, which is the strongest of the possible hypotheses
listed above for the experience operators and which implies all the others (except the
Unit-Normalization Hypothesis, which is inconsistent with the Projection Hypothe-
sis unless all the projection operators are of rank one). Then one could either have
up to two orthogonal rank-one projection operators, or the one identity operator, for
the set of experience operators. Only in the former case does the Unit-Normalization
Hypothesis also hold.
If in the discrete SQMD case we weaken the Projection Hypothesis to the Se-
quence of Projections Hypothesis, then without further restrictions we can have an
arbitrarily large number of experience operators, even if we continue to assume the
Pairwise Independence Hypothesis. Of course, if we also make the Linear Indepen-
dence Hypothesis, then we are again limited to at most N2 experience operators
(e.g., four for the two-dimensional Hilbert-space model), but in the following I shall
not assume this.
Suppose we consider the case in which each sequence has two rank-one projection
operators, of which the first can be, in matrix notation, either
Q =
1
2
(
1 + cos θ1 sin θ1e
iφ1
sin θ1e
−iφ1 1− cos θ1
)
(65)
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or I −Q, and of which the second can be either
R =
1
2
(
1 + cos θ2 sin θ2e
iφ2
sin θ2e
−iφ2 1− cos θ2
)
(66)
or I −R. The resulting set of four sequences are thus
C(1) = RQ, (67)
C(2) = R(I −Q) = R− RQ, (68)
C(3) = (I − R)Q = Q− RQ. (69)
C(4) = (I − R)(I −Q) = I −Q− R +RQ, (70)
and by the Sequence of Projections Hypothesis the experience operators are then
E(1) = C(1)†C(1) = QRQ, (71)
E(2) = (I −Q)R(I −Q) = R−QR −RQ +QRQ, (72)
E(3) = Q(I −R)Q = Q−QRQ, (73)
E(4) = (I −Q)(I −R)(I −Q) = I −Q−R +QR +RQ−QRQ. (74)
Now assume that the state is given by the pure-state density matrix (i.e., another
rank-one projection operator)
ρ =
1
2
(
1 + cos θ0 sin θ0e
iφ0
sin θ0e
−iφ0 1− cos θ0
)
. (75)
Then in this case the Consistent Sequence of Projections Hypothesis, the Individ-
ually Weak Decoherent Histories Hypothesis, and the Weak Decoherent Histories
Hypothesis all give the same single real equation
σ[QR +RQ− 2QRQ] ≡ 2ReTr[(QR−QRQ)ρ] = 0. (76)
Similarly, the Individually Medium Decoherent Histories Hypothesis, the Medium
Decoherent Histories Hypothesis, and the Individually Strong Decoherent Histories
Hypothesis all give the one complex equation
σ[QR −QRQ] ≡ Tr[(QR−QRQ)ρ] = 0. (77)
In the present example, the Strong Decoherent Histories Hypothesis is impossible
to satisfy, since it would require four orthogonal projection operators (one for each
sequence) in the two-dimensional Hilbert space. Finally, the Linearly Positive His-
tories Hypothesis gives the inequality
max (0, σ[Q+R− I]) ≤ Reσ[QR] ≡ ReTr(QRρ) ≤ min (σ[Q], σ[R]). (78)
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One can express these conditions (76)-(78) geometrically in the following manner:
On the unit two-sphere representing the spin directions corresponding to the pro-
jection operators and state above in the two-dimensional Hilbert space, draw three
great circles, one through (θ0, φ0) and (θ1, φ1), one through (θ0, φ0) and (θ2, φ2),
and one through (θ1, φ1) and (θ2, φ2). These will generically divide the two-sphere
into eight spherical triangles, four of which are parity reverses of the antipodal four.
Now the conditions (76)-(78) can be represented by geometric properties of these
triangles.
In particular, the condition given by the real Eq. (76) is equivalent to the con-
dition that the two great circles through the point (θ1, φ1) (which represents Q)
intersect orthogonally there, so that each of the eight triangles are right spherical
triangles (or the degenerate limit in which (θ1, φ1) or the antipodal point to that
coincides with one of the two vertices representing ρ and R). This condition is sat-
isfied by a three-parameter subset (of measure zero) of the four-parameter set of
directions (θ1, φ1) and (θ2, φ2), assuming that the direction (θ0, φ0) representing the
state is kept fixed.
Similarly, the condition given by the complex Eq. (77) is only satisfied in the
degenerate case in which (θ1, φ1) or its antipode coincides with either (θ0, φ0) or
(θ2, φ2); i.e., when Q or I − Q coincides with either ρ or R. This condition is
satisfied by a discrete family of two-parameter subsets (also of measure zero) of the
four-parameter set of directions (θ1, φ1) and (θ2, φ2).
Finally, the Linearly Positive Histories condition, given by the inequality (78), is
equivalent to the condition that none of the eight triangles have area or solid angle
greater than pi (which is twice the average). Unlike the other conditions, which give
sets of measure zero, this inequality condition has a positive measure, (
√
128−9)/15,
or about 0.154247, of the total measure for all possible choices of the two directions
(θ1, φ1) and (θ2, φ2) that define the sequence of projection operators C(p), assuming
a measure density for these directions that is uniform over the two-sphere.
One point of all these examples is to show that the additional structure of the
conscious world and the corresponding awareness and experience operators in the
quantum world lead to probabilities that need not be merely proportional to the or-
dinary quantum “probabilities” in any single set of possibilities in the same Hilbert
space (the “probabilities” that I am claiming are merely fictitious). Only in the
cases of very strong hypotheses, such as the Commuting Projection Hypothesis, the
Orthogonal Projection Hypothesis, and some of the various Histories Hypotheses,
can one get such proportionalities, since in more general cases one simply has more
perceptions than possibilities in any single set. Unless one starts from a broader set
of probabilities than those for a single set of possibilities (whether for events or for
histories) in the same Hilbert space, one simply does not get anything proportional
to the true (frequency-type) probabilities for perceptions in Sensible Quantum Me-
chanics unless one makes restrictive assumptions about the additional structure of
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the expectation values of the awareness or experience operators.
One way to circumvent this conclusion is to extend the Hilbert space to a tensor
product of copies of the original Hilbert space and consider ordinary quantum “prob-
abilities” in this larger Hilbert space. For example, suppose one has the sequence
of n projection operators C(h) = {P (h, 1), P (h, 2), · · · , P (h, n)} representing a ho-
mogeneous history h. (Note that, unlike in the Sequence of Projections Hypothesis,
this C is not the product of n projection operators in the original Hilbert space, but
an ordered sequence of n projection operators.) This sequence can now be regarded
as a projection operator on the tensor product of n copies of the original Hilbert
space [13, 15, 16, 18] with the corresponding state σn which is the tensor product
of n copies of σ. Then one can define a decoherence functional on pairs of atomic
histories as
D(h, h′) = σn[C(h′)†C(h)]
≡ σ[P (h′, 1)P (h, 1)]σ[P (h′, 2)P (h, 2)] · · ·σ[P (h′, n)P (h, n)]. (79)
One can now extend this definition of C(h) for a homogeneous history h to one for
an inhomogeneous history h (a sum of sequences that cannot be written as a single
sequence) by linearity and then define the corresponding decoherence functional
D(h, h′) from Eq. (79) by requiring it to be bilinear in both C(h) and C(h′). This
decoherence functional is then not the standard one that is an expectation value
in the state σ in the original Hilbert space, but it is an expectation value in the
product state σn in the product Hilbert space. It obviously obeys all the decoherence
conditions of hermiticity, positivity, additivity, and normalization [10, 11, 13, 15, 16,
18] for any normalized positive state σ, thus illustrating how Eq. (79) and its linear
extension to inhomogeneous histories gives a decoherence functional that decoheres
for all pairs of histories.
Now, for simplicity, consider the case in which there is only a finite number n of
possible perceptions in the set M , each with its corresponding positive experience
operator E(p). (The case in which there is an infinite number of possible perceptions
would necessitate going to an infinite tensor product of the original Hilbert space,
which will not be done here.) Assume, as is the case in which the state is given by a
density matrix in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, that each E(p) can be written as
a sum, with positive coefficients, of a complete set of orthogonal projection operators
P (hp):
E(p) =
∑
hp
λhpP (hp). (80)
Here we can regard p as an integer between 1 and n, inclusive, that labels the n
perceptions in the set M . Now we can regard a basic homogeneous history h as
a particular sequence h1, h2, · · · , hn of the n labels, giving a particular sequence of
projection operators, C(h) = {P (h1), P (h2), · · · , P (hn)}. Then from the decoher-
ence functional D(h, h′) given by Eq. (79), whose diagonal element D(h, h) can be
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considered to be the quantum “probability”
Pr(h) ≡ Pr(h1, h2, · · · , hn) ≡ D(h, h) = σ[P (h1)]σ[P (h2)] · · ·σ[P (hn)], (81)
one can indeed form linear combinations for the measure m(p) = σ[E(p)] for each
perception:
m(p) =
∑
h1,···,hn
λhpPr(h1, · · · , hn). (82)
However, if the number n of perceptions is larger than the square of the dimension
N of the original Hilbert space, then in general one cannot write the measure for
each perception as a linear combination (using coefficients that depend only on
the experience operators and that are independent of the state itself) of a set of
“probabilities” that are expectation values for a single set of possibilities (whose
“probabilities” add up to one) in a state in the original Hilbert space.
Of course, if one adopts a “many-many-worlds” interpretation for the quantum
world and assumes the reality of the “probabilities” for all sets of possibilities for
some appropriate family defining all of these sets, then this broader set of “probabil-
ities” in suitable cases can give quantities that are proportional to the expectation
values of the awareness or experience operators. Thus one could say that the effect of
a quantum state upon the measures in the conscious world where our experiences lie
is proportional to an appropriate set of “probabilities” that can be ascribed to that
state in the quantum world (assuming that the awareness or experience operators
are known), but it can easily be within Sensible Quantum Mechanics that the mea-
sures for the conscious world is not directly given by any single set of “probabilities”
(adding up to unity) in the same Hilbert space of the quantum world. Unless Sen-
sible Quantum Mechanics takes on a very restricted form, or unless one extends the
Hilbert space sufficiently, the ordinary probabilism applied to the quantum world is
simply inadequate to give directly the measure for all experiences.
11 EPR and Schro¨dinger’s Cat
It may be of interest to give a brief analysis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) “paradox” [47] combined with that of Schro¨dinger’s cat [48]. I shall use a
variant of Bohm’s modification [49] of the EPR experimental setup to two spin-half
atoms in a singlet state.
Suppose that the two atoms are moved far apart (while their spins remain
undisturbed in their perfectly anticorrelated singlet state of total angular momen-
tum zero), and then interactions are made with the atoms’ spins in two spacelike-
separated regions of flat Minkowski spacetime, say A and B. Suppose that in region
A, a perfect nondemolition measurement interaction is made of the spin of the atom
there in the z-direction, and suppose that the measuring device is further coupled
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to a conscious being so that there results a set of conscious perceptions S↑ corre-
sponding to perceiving that the experiment has been done, that one is in region A,
that the spin direction is now known by the being, and that the atom was mea-
sured to have spin up, and another set of conscious perceptions S↓ corresponding
to perceiving that the experiment has been done, that one is in region A, that the
spin direction is now known by the being, and that the atom was measured to have
spin down. Here I shall assume an SQMPC theory with the Commuting Projection
Hypothesis (and later the restriction of this to a SQMPPC theory with the Com-
muting Product Projection Hypothesis when I discuss a conscious being in region B
with different discrete components to his or her perceptions), so that the awareness
operators A(S↑) and A(S↓) for the two sets of perceptions described above are com-
muting projection operators which also commute with awareness operators I shall
describe momentarily for certain sets of perceptions of being in region B.
I shall further assume for simplicity the idealization that the quantum state
with the experimental setup in region A, including the coupling to the conscious
being, is such that A(S↑) and A(S↓) have the same expectation values as commuting
projection operators P↑ and P↓ for the spin of the atom in region A, each multiplied
by a common commuting projection operator Pother for other common factors that
lead to the perception that the experiment has been done, that one is in region
A, and that the spin direction is now known by the being. Thus I am assuming
a perfect correlation between the spin of the atom and whatever (e.g., some state
in the brain) it is that directly causes the perception that the spin is up or down.
Furthermore, the idealization I am assuming implies that whether the spin is up
or down has no effect on the expectation value of the awareness operator (i.e., the
measure) for the set of perceptions that the experiment has been done, that one is
in region A, and that the spin direction is now known by the being. (For example, I
am assuming that no anesthetic is administered to the being if and only if the atom
has spin up, which certainly could affect the relative measures of the two sets of
conscious perceptions by reducing the measure for A(S↑), though in principle SQM
is capable of handling such effects by a more complicated analysis.)
Now since the pair of atoms was in the singlet state (further assuming that the
perception that the experiment has been done does indeed imply that, though again
SQM could in principle handle the more realistic case in which such perceptions
may be mistaken), the expectation values for P↑ and P↓ are identical, and so by our
idealization the measures µ(S↑) and µ(S↓) are also identical, being the expectation
values of A(S↑) and A(S↓) that are the same as those of the commuting projec-
tion operators P↑ and P↓ multiplied by the common commuting projection operator
Pother. Thus in region A there is an equal relative probability to perceive the atom
there having spin up or down, completely independent of what may be happening in
region B. In other words, under the assumption of local quantum field theory (which
may be only approximately valid if the fundamental theory is something different,
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such as string theory), and under the assumption that the awareness operators for
the perceptions that one is in region A are operators that can be confined to that
region (which might be only approximately valid as well, even under the assumption
of local field theory for the quantum world), there is no superluminal propagation of
anything from region B that can have any effect on anything observed or perceived
in the spacelike-separated region A [50].
Now let us suppose that in region B there is a device to make a nondemolition
measurement interaction with the spin of the atom there in a direction at an angle θ
from the z-direction (which I assume is parallelly propagated across the flat space-
time from the z-direction in region A). Suppose that further there is a “diabolical
device” [48] to poison a cat if and only if the spin is measured to be down (i.e., if
the measuring device, whose record of the measurement interaction is assumed to
have become perfectly correlated with the atom spin in the θ-direction, has a record
indicating that the spin is down). For the purposes of the following discussion, di-
vide the cat into “head” and “body” (conceptually, not physically; I do not mean
to behead the cat!). Assume that if the cat is poisoned, that both the head and
the body are dead, but that if the cat is not poisoned, both the head and body are
alive.
If the projection operator for the atom spin in region B to be up in the θ-direction
is Pup and to be down is Pdown, if the projection operator for the cat head to be alive
is Phead alive and to be dead is Phead dead, and if the projection operator for the cat
body to be alive is Pbody alive and to be dead is Pbody dead (all of which are assumed
to commute), then the density operator for the atom spin and the cat’s property
of having its head and body alive or dead (multiplied by the unit operator for the
rest of the total system) is, under the idealization that the pair of atoms started in
the singlet state and that the coupling to the measuring apparatus and diabolical
device were perfect, proportional to
PupPhead alivePbody alive + PdownPhead deadPbody dead. (83)
Thus there is assumed to be a perfect correlation between the spin of the atom in
region B and the “liveliness” of the cat’s head and body.
Now suppose we add a conscious being that perceives that the experiment has
been done as stated (which I shall for simplicity assume excludes the conscious
perceptions of the cat, even if it is still alive; if the cat could perceive that the ex-
periment has been done and could correctly perceive the spin direction, presumably
it could only perceive that the spin were up, since if the spin were down, the cat
would be dead and presumably would have no perceptions) and that the being is in
region B, and, as for the being perceived to be in region A, assume the idealization
that these perceptions are indeed perfectly correlated with the state of affairs but
are unaffected by whether the atom spin is up or down. (For example, the poison
is not supposed to kill this conscious being or otherwise affect the measure of these
perceptions of him or her.)
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Furthermore assume that this conscious being interacts with (e.g., sees) the live-
liness of the cat’s head and body. I now explicitly assume that we have an SQMPPC
theory with the Assumption of Perception Components, one for the perceived state
of the head of the cat and one for the state of the body.
We now must face the question of what it is about the head and body of the cat
that can lead to different perception components. The most realistic idealization
seems to be that the SQMPPC theory is such that if the head and body are alive,
they will be perceived to be alive, and if they are dead, they will be perceived to be
dead. Then different conceivable perceptions could be in the set S(head alive, body alive)
with the components {chead alive, cbody alive, . . .} if both the head and body were per-
ceived to be alive, with the corresponding awareness operator having an expectation
value equal to that of Phead alivePbody alive and hence being nonzero. Or, they could
be in the set S(head dead, body dead) with components {chead dead, cbody dead, . . .} if both
the head and body were perceived to be dead, with the corresponding awareness
operator having an expectation value equal to that of Phead deadPbody dead and hence
being the same nonzero value, in the idealization of perfect coupling and with the
pair of atoms starting out in the singlet spin state. Thus the relative probability of
perceiving that the cat is alive is the same as that of perceiving that the cat is dead,
assuming SQMPPC and the various idealizations above, independent of what may
be happening in region A.
Other conceivable perceptions of the conscious being in region B that correctly
perceives that the experiment has been done as stated could be in the set
S(head alive, body dead) with the components {chead alive, cbody dead, . . .} if the head were
perceived to be alive but the body were perceived to be dead, with the corresponding
awareness operator having an expectation value equal to that of Phead alivePbody dead,
or in the set S(head dead, body alive) with components {chead dead, cbody alive, . . .} if the
head were perceived to be dead but the body were perceived to be alive, with
the corresponding awareness operator having an expectation value equal to that of
Phead deadPbody alive. However, both of these sets of perceptions have zero expecta-
tion value in the idealized state being assumed, so there will be no perception of a
disagreement between the liveliness of the head and body of the cat with the ideal-
izations being made. This seems to agree fairly well with my perception of what has
been reported to me, though in my sheltered life as a theoretical physicist I cannot
presently recall any memories of actually having seen a dead cat myself.
However, one could imagine an alternative SQMPPC theory to the original one
just described, in which the components of perceptions are not directly coupled
to the eigenstates of the liveliness of the cat’s head and body, but, say, to equal
linear combinations of these eigenstates (for either the head or the body liveliness
subsystem as may be the case),
|head+〉 = (|head alive〉+ |head dead〉)/√2, (84)
|head−〉 = (|head alive〉 − |head dead〉)/√2, (85)
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|body+〉 = (|body alive〉+ |body dead〉)/√2, (86)
|body−〉 = (|body alive〉 − |body dead〉)/√2, (87)
or, more precisely, to the corresponding projection operators
Phead+ = |head+〉〈head+| ⊗ Iall but head, (88)
Phead− = |head−〉〈head−| ⊗ Iall but head, (89)
Pbody+ = |body+〉〈body+| ⊗ Iall but body, (90)
Pbody− = |body−〉〈body−| ⊗ Iall but body, (91)
where Iall but head is the identity operator for all of the system except for the head
liveliness subsystem with its states |head+〉 and |head−〉, and similarly Iall but body is
the identity operator for all of the system except for the body liveliness subsystem.
Then different conceivable perceptions could be in the set S(head+,body+) with the
components {chead+, cbody+, . . .} if both the head and body were perceived to be
in their + states, with the corresponding awareness operator having an expecta-
tion value equal to that of Phead+Pbody+; in the set S(head−,body−) with components
{chead−, cbody−, . . .} if both the head and body were perceived to be in their − states,
with the corresponding awareness operator having an expectation value equal to that
of Phead−Pbody−; in the set S(head+,body−) with the components {chead+, cbody−, . . .} if
the head were perceived to be in the + state but the body were perceived to be
in the − state, with the corresponding awareness operator having an expectation
value equal to that of Phead+Pbody−; or in the set S(head−,body+) with components
{chead−, cbody+, . . .} if the head were perceived to be in its − state but the body were
perceived to be in its + state, with the corresponding awareness operator having
an expectation value equal to that of Phead−Pbody+. All of these awareness opera-
tors would have the same nonzero expectation value in the idealizations of perfect
coupling and of the pair of atoms starting out in the singlet spin state.
Thus in this alternative SQMPPC theory and in the idealized experiment being
described, there would be no correlation between the perception of the states of the
cat’s head and body, when one averages over all sets of perceptions, weighted by
their measures, in which the experiment is perceived to have occurred (assuming that
this component of the perception is indeed perfectly correlated with whether or not
the experiment occurred as stated). Presumably we might describe the conscious
being as being confused if he or she perceives a disagreement between the states
of the cat’s head and body. In the original SQMPPC theory described above, the
measure was zero (under the idealized assumptions) for such “confused” perceptions,
so all perceptions with positive measure were “unconfused,” but in the alternative
SQMPPC the weighted fraction of unconfused perceptions was only one half (and
would have been only 21−n if one had conceptually divided the cat into n parts that
were all assigned + and − states to which the conscious perceptions were perfectly
correlated).
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The comparison of these two conceivable SQMPPC theories shows that if it
is desired that perceptions p be all unconfused in idealized cases, their components
ci(p) should have their corresponding projection operators having expectation values
equal to those of P [ci(p)] coupled to things (e.g., states of parts of the cat) that are
entirely correlated (e.g., the “liveliness” property of being alive or dead, rather
than the + or − properties) in these cases. These preferred projection operators
for unconfused conscious perceptions are similar to the Information Basis of States
for quantum measurements [51], except that no claim is made in SQM that the
operators associated with perceptions form a complete basis.
However, it still is somewhat confusing to me why in idealized cases our per-
ceptions actually seem to be rather unconfused, why the original rather than the
alternative SQMPPC theory seems more accurate (or more likely to make our un-
confused perceptions typical). One might argue that if they were not unconfused,
then we could not act coherently and so would not survive. This would seem to be
a good argument only if our perceptions really do affect our actions in the quantum
world and are not just epiphenomena that are determined by the quantum world
without having any effect back on it. Another argument similarly suggesting that
explanations might be simpler if conscious perceptions acted back on the quantum
world will be mentioned briefly in the Conclusions. But on the other hand, it is
not obvious how perceptions could affect the quantum world in a relatively simple
way in detail (though it is easy to speculate on general ways in which there might
be some effect; see [1] and the Conclusions below). So although it appears to be
unexplained, it conceivably could be that conscious perceptions do not affect the
quantum world but are determined by it in just such a way that in most cases they
are not too confused. To mimic Einstein, I might say, “The most confusing thing
about perceptions is that they are generally unconfused.”
As an aside, I should say that although epiphenomenalism seems to leave it mys-
terious why typical perceptions are unconfused, I do not think it leaves it mysterious
that perceptions occur, despite a na¨ıve expectation that the latter is also mysterious.
The na¨ıve argument is that if the conscious world has no effect on the quantum world
(usually called the physical world [3, 4], in contrast to my use of that term to include
both the quantum world and the conscious world), and if the development of life
in the quantum world occurs by natural selection, the development of consciousness
would have no effect on this natural selection and so could not be explained by it.
Nevertheless, one can give an answer analogous to that I have heard was given by
the former Fermilab Director Robert Wilson when he was was asked by a Congres-
sional committee what Fermilab contributed to the defense of the nation: ”Nothing.
But it helps make the nation worth defending.” Similarly, if epiphenomenalism is
correct, consciousness may contribute nothing to the survival of the species, but it
may help make certain species worth surviving. More accurately, it may not con-
tribute to the evolution of complexity, but it may select us (probably not uniquely)
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as complex organisms which have typical perceptions. Then our consciousness would
not be surprising, because we are selected simply as typical conscious beings.
This selection as typical conscious beings might also help explain why we can
do highly abstract theoretical mathematics and physics that does not seem to help
us much with our survival as a species. If we are selected by the measure of our
consciousness, and if that is positively correlated with a certain kind of complexity
that is itself correlated with the ability to do theoretical mathematics and physics,
then it would not be surprising that we can do this better than the average hominid
that survives as well as we do (say averaging over all the Everett many worlds).
Returning to a consideration of the EPR experiment, the perceptions by con-
scious beings in the spacelike-separated regions A and B occur independently in
SQM (under the idealizations of local quantum field theory and of the assumption
that the relevant awareness operators are confined to either region A or B) and do
not show any of the EPR correlations. To perceive the EPR correlations between
regions A and B, one needs perceptions with awareness operators whose expectation
values are affected by what is happening in both regions. One obvious way is to have
these awareness operators in a region C which is to the causal future of both regions
A and B. For example, a signal could be sent from each region, a signal that is
perfectly correlated with the result of the spin measurement in that region (another
idealization made for simplicity). Then one can imagine conscious perceptions of a
being in C (meaning that the corresponding awareness operators can be localized to
that region) with one component of each determined by the signal from A and the
other component determined by the signal from B.
For example, there could be the set S↑↑ of perceptions in which both signals
indicate that the corresponding spin is up in the measured directions (which differed
by the angle θ), the set S↑↓ of perceptions that the spin in A is up and that the spin
in B is down, the set S↓↑ of perceptions that the spin in A is down and that the spin
in B is up, and the set S↓↓ of perceptions that the spin in both A and B is down. The
awareness operators for these four sets of perceptions could have expectation values,
ideally, the same as those of P↑Pup, P↑Pdown, P↓Pup, and P↓Pdown, respectively, each
multiplied by a common commuting projection operator PotherC for other common
factors that lead to the perception that the experiment has been done, that one is
in region C, and that both spin directions are now known as a result of receiving
signals from both regions A and B.
Now one can readily calculate that if the pair of atoms starts in the singlet spin
state, then under the idealizations above, the sets of perceptions S↑↑ and S↓↓ each
have the same measure, which is tan2 θ/2 of the measure for each of the sets S↑↓ and
S↓↑. Thus if θ = 0, there will be no measure for the first two sets of perceptions, and
the conscious being in C will necessarily perceive that the two spins are opposite,
the perfect EPR anticorrelation, even though the measure for each of the last two
sets of perceptions is equal so that one cannot uniquely predict whether it will be
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the spin in A or the spin in B that is perceived to be up in all perceptions with
nonzero measure.
However, since one sees that the EPR correlations between regions A and B can
be perceived by conscious beings (assuming that their awareness operators can be
fairly well localized to where we can thus define these beings to be) only if they
are to the causal future of both A and B (e.g., in region C), we do not have any
superluminal propagation of anything in SQM if it is based on local quantum field
theory. (Of course, the ultimate replacement of quantum field theory, e.g., by string
theory, may eliminate this locality property of the quantum world, except as some
sort of approximation in suitable circumstances.) Furthermore, just as one may con-
clude concerning quantum mechanics in the Everett interpretation [50], so too the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen physical reality is completely described by Sensible Quan-
tum Mechanics, contrary to the claim that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [47] made
about quantum mechanics when all they had was the Copenhagen interpretation.
12 Questions and Speculations
One can use the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics to ask questions and
make speculations that would be difficult without such a framework. I shall here
give some examples, without intending to imply that Sensible Quantum Mechanics
itself, even if true, would guarantee that these questions and speculations make
sense, but it does seem to allow circumstances in which they might.
First, in the model of quantum field theory on a classical spacetime with no
symmetries, and with a quantum state having well-localized human brains on some
Cauchy hypersurface labeled by time t, one might ask whether it is possible to have
two quite different perceptions, say p and p′, in nearly the same Everett world in
the sense of having the f(p, p′) of Eq. (19) near unity, and giving E(p) and E(p′)
both with the same preferred time tp = t and both localized (by the rather ad hoc
prescription of Section 8) in balls in the same brain. In other words, can one brain
have two different (maximal) perceptions in the same world at the same time, each
not aware of the other? Unless we are solipsists (or unless we adopt the Orthogonal
Projection Hypothesis, in which case we say that different perceptions all occur in
different Everett worlds), we generally believe this is possible for two separate brains,
but would one brain be sufficient? Furthermore, if it is possible, can the two balls
(corresponding to p and p′ respectively) be overlapping spatially, or need they be
separate regions in the brain?
Second, one might ask whether and how the sum (or integral) of the measures
(or measure densities) m(p) associated with an individual brain region at the time t
depends on the brain characteristics. One might speculate that it might be greater
for brains that are in some sense more intelligent, so that in a crude sense brighter
brains have more perceptions. This could explain why you do not perceive yourself
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to be an insect, for example, even though there are far more insects than humans.
Third, one might conjecture that an appropriate measure on perceptions might
give a possible explanation of why most of us perceive ourselves to be living on the
same planet on which our species developed. This observation might seem surprising
when one considers that we may be technologically near the point at which we
could leave Earth and colonize large regions of the Galaxy [52], presumably greatly
increasing the number of humans beyond the roughly 1011 that are believed to have
lived on Earth. If so, why don’t we have the perceptions of one of the vast numbers
of humans that may be born away from Earth? One answer is that some sort
of doom is likely to prevent this vast colonization of the Galaxy from happening
[53, 54, 55, 56], though these arguments are not conclusive [57]. Although I would
not be surprised if such a doom were likely, I would na¨ıvely expect it to be not so
overwhelmingly probable that the probability of vast colonization would be so small
as is the presumably very small ratio of the total number of humans who could
ever live on Earth to those who could live throughout the Galaxy if the colonization
occurs. Then, even though the colonization may be unlikely, it may still produce a
higher measure for conscious perceptions of humans living off Earth than on it.
However, another possibility is that colonization of the Galaxy is not too improb-
able, but that it is mostly done by self-replicating computers or machines who do
not tolerate many humans going along, so that the number of actual human coloniz-
ers is not nearly so large as the total number who could live throughout the Galaxy
if the computers or machines did not dominate the colonization. If the number of
these computers or machines dominate humans as “intelligent” beings (in the sense
of having certain information-processing capabilities), one might still have the ques-
tion of why we perceive ourselves as being humans rather than as being one of the
vastly greater numbers of such machines. But the explanation might simply be that
the weight of conscious perceptions (the sum or integral of the m(p)’s corresponding
to the type of perceptions under consideration) is dominated by human perceptions,
even if the number of “intelligent” beings is not. In other words, human brains may
be much more efficient in producing conscious perceptions than the kinds of self-
replicating computers or machines which may be likely to dominate the colonization
of the Galaxy. If such machines are more “intelligent” than humans in terms of
information-processing capabilities and yet are less efficient in producing conscious
perceptions, our perceptions of being human would suggest that the measure of
perceptions is not merely correlated with “intelligence.” (On the other hand, if the
measure of perceptions is indeed strongly correlated with “intelligence” in the sense
of information-processing capabilities, perhaps it might be the case that Galactic
colonization is most efficiently done by self-replicating computers or machines that
are not so “intelligent” as humans. After all, insects and even bacteria have been
more efficient in colonizing a larger fraction of Earth than have humans.)
It might be tempting to take the observations that these speculations might
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explain (our perceptions of ourselves as human rather than as insect, and our per-
ceptions of ourselves as humans on our home planet) as evidence tending to support
the speculations. One could summarize such reasoning as a generalization of the
Weak Anthropic Principle [58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64] that might be called the Con-
ditional Aesthemic Principle (CAP): given that we are conscious beings, our con-
scious perceptions are likely to be typical perceptions in the conscious world with
its measure.
If one uses the dual typicality Td(p) defined by Eq. (28) as an indication of how
“likely” a perception is, one can say that there is a 99% likelihood that Td(p) ≥ 0.01.
For example, if one restricts oneself to the perception of a continuous variable for
which the measure density has a gaussian distribution, then at the 99% likelihood
level, the variable should be between about 0.0062666117 and about 2.8070337863
standard deviations from the mean. Values closer to the mean are “too good to be
likely,” and values further from the mean are “too bad to be likely,” at least at the
99% likelihood level.
In addition to the typicality T (p) defined by Eq. (21) and the dual typicality
Td(p) defined by Eq. (28) as indications of how “likely” a perception is, the discussion
above suggests the usefulness of other measures of the typicality or likelihood of a
perception. Unfortunately, there is the apparent arbitrariness of their definition. If
one makes a rather ad hoc definition of typicality and then finds that one’s perception
is atypical with respect to this definition, one may have grounds to be sceptical that
it really is evidence against the detailed Sensible Quantum Mechanics theory that
predicts the low typicality-thus-defined of one’s perception. For example, I have the
perception of having been one of the last 10−7 or so of those born in 1948 (since I was
born about 90 minutes before midnight on December 31 according to the local time,
ten time zones west of Greenwich, in the lowly-populated Territory of Alaska, fairly
near the point B of Figure 8.3 on page 212 of my Ph.D. advisor’s textbook [65], with
only Hawaii providing a significant population in that or any other time zone further
west), so I am atypical in that regard, but it is probably not so surprising that after
living over 40 years I have finally found some particular detail about myself that by
itself might appear unusual.
I also noticed recently that the fourth (and, I would guess, last) in the sequence
of at least four Mersenne primes given by the (non-Mersenne) prime seed N0 = 2 and
the recursion relation Nn+1 = 2
Nn−1 is within one-half of one percent of the inverse
gravitational fine structure constant for the proton (the square of the ratio of the
Planck mass to the proton mass). (The logarithms of these two large numbers agree
to about one part in 19000± 500.) If the inverse of the gravitational fine structure
constant is an environmental constant that varies from component to component of
the quantum state of the universe, then I would expect it to be rather atypical to
perceive it to be so close to 2127 − 1, but since there are presumably so many other
unusual things that I could have found instead (and which indeed Eddington [66]
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did find and claim to have found a theory for), I would think that surely it is just
another numerical coincidence and thus that the apparent resulting “atypicality” is
just an artifact of an ad hoc definition for it.
I could also cite various other perceptions that na¨ıvely might seem atypical, such
as my frequent remembrance that in 1992 the U.S., Canada, and the new Russian
Republic had ages in years that were all perfect cubes (216, 125, and 1 respectively),
my noticing that an integer often considered unlucky in Western culture is the only
positive integer fourth root of the sum of two successive positive square integers, and
my fascination with the fact that there is a mystery word (for which I have a long
standing offer of $10 for the first person who can find it) whose modern definition in
the British Oxford English Dictionary gives a certain quantity, but whose definition
in the American Webster’s Third International Dictionary gives a different quantity,
larger by the ratio of about
1.0006551997916815342586087238773730720409883464864441784178751363.
Part of the explanation for such ‘unusual’ perceptions is what I have called the
Attention Effect (see the last paper in [1]). This is the fact that unusual events
attract our attention, so that we tend to focus on them and spend a longer time
being conscious of them. The measure for a set of perceptions presumably increases
with the time (when that approximate concept is applicable) spent having them, so
events that attract our attention for longer periods of time will presumably lead to
sets of conscious perceptions having greater measure and hence being less atypical
than we might have thought..
Therefore, one should be very careful in using the Conditional Aesthemic Princi-
ple, even though it might be useful in explaining certain features of our perceptions
that might more na¨ıvely be thought to be surprising.
13 Conclusions
In conclusion, I am proposing that Sensible Quantum Mechanics is the best
framework we have at the present level for understanding conscious perceptions
and the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Of course, the framework would only
become a complete theory once one had the setM of all perceptions p, the awareness
operators A(S), and the quantum state σ of the universe (and preferably also the
prior measure µ0(S) in order to test the theory and compare it with others).
Even such a complete theory of the quantum world and the conscious world
affected by it need not be the ultimate simplest complete theory of the combined
physical world. There might be a simpler set of unifying principles from which one
could in principle deduce the perceptions, awareness operators, and quantum state,
or perhaps some simpler entities that replaced them. For example, although in
the present framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the quantum world (i.e., its
state), along with the awareness operators, determines the measure for perceptions in
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the conscious world, there might be a reverse effect of the conscious world affecting
the quantum world to give a simpler explanation than we have at present of the
coherence of our perceptions (as pondered in Section 11) and of the correlation
between will and action (why my desire to do something I feel am capable of doing
is correlated with my perception of actually doing it, i.e., why I “do as I please”).
If the quantum state is partially determined by an action functional, can desires in
the conscious world affect that functional (say in a coordinate-invariant way that
therefore does not violate energy-momentum conservation)? Such considerations
may call for a more unified framework than Sensible Quantum Mechanics, which
one might call Sensational Quantum Mechanics [1]. Such a more unified framework
need not violate the limited assumptions of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, though
it might do that as well and perhaps reduce to Sensible Quantum Mechanics only
in a certain approximate sense.
To explain these frameworks in terms of an analogy, consider a classical model of
spinless massive point charged particles and an electromagnetic field in Minkowski
spacetime. Let the charged particles be analogous to the quantum world (or the
quantum state part of it), and the electromagnetic field be analogous to the conscious
world (the set of perceptions with its measure µ(S)). At the level of a simplistic
materialist mind-body philosophy, one might merely say that the electromagnetic
field is part of, or perhaps a property of, the material particles. At the level of
Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the charged particle worldlines are the analogue of
the quantum state, the retarded electromagnetic field propagator (Coulomb’s law
in the nonrelativistic approximation) is the analogue of the awareness operators,
and the electromagnetic field determined by the worldlines of the charged particles
and by the retarded propagator is the analogue of the conscious world. (Here one
can see that this analogue of Sensible Quantum Mechanics is valid only if there is
no free incoming electromagnetic radiation.) At the level of Sensational Quantum
Mechanics, at which the conscious world may affect the quantum world, the charged
particle worldlines are partially determined by the electromagnetic field through the
change in the action it causes. (This more unified framework better explains the
previous level but does not violate its description, which simply had the particle
worldlines given.) At a yet higher level, there is the possibility of incoming free
electromagnetic waves, which would violate the previous frameworks that assumed
the electromagnetic field was uniquely determined by the charged particle worldlines.
(An analogous suggestion for intrinsic degrees of freedom for consciousness has been
made by Linde [67].) Finally, at a still higher level, there might be an even more
unifying framework in which both charged particles and the electromagnetic field
are seen as modes of a single entity (e.g., to take a popular current speculation, a
superstring).
Therefore, although it is doubtful that Sensible Quantum Mechanics is the cor-
rect framework for the final unifying theory (if one does indeed exist), it seems to
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me to be a move in that direction that is consistent with what we presently know
about consciousness and the physical world. At least it seems to be an augmenta-
tion of ordinary quantum mechanics (without the collapse postulate) that cannot
be criticized as being incomplete for not predicting (when the framework is fleshed
out into a complete SQM theory) precisely what happens during observations.
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